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Chapter 1: Introduction, the Individual Logic of Suicide Terrorism 
Outside the Shia town of Fua in Syria, a young and frightened Uzbek militant 
named Jafar al-Tayyar sits in the open deck of an armored personal carrier.  Jafar, 
barely in his 20s, bursts into tears.  His comrades in Al Qaeda’s al-Nusra front, one of 
two competing militant Islamist groups in Syria (the other being the Islamic State of 
Syria and Iraq (ISIS)), quickly surround the deck.  They embrace and encourage the 
young man.  One of his friends tells him, “Jafar, my brother, don’t be afraid.  When you 
are scared, remember Allah.” Jafar responds, “I’m just scared I won’t succeed.”1  Jafar 
composes himself, wipes his face, and starts to drive the explosives laden carrier along a 
barren road into town.   
Al-Nusra members record the scene from two perspectives, with a handheld 
camera that catches the martyrdom encouragement and with a unarmed aerial vehical 
(UAV) that will catch the act of martyrdom itself.  The UAV hovers into the sky, 
follows the car from a distance, tracks the car turning into downtown, and records an 
explosion from the center of town.  The al-Nusra video narrator describes Jafar as the 
first martyr from Mawarannahr, the Arabic name for the area of Central Asia that 
straddles the borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Krygrstan, and Kazakhstan, likely 
mentioned to recruit more martyrs from Central Asia.   
The event represents many trends, developments, and questions concerning 
modern suicide bombing campaigns: 
• The human smart bomb, guiding a payload to a destination that otherwise could 
not be reached without sophisticated technology 
                                                 
1 Webb, Sam.  “Suicide bomber bursts into tears and is comforted by jihadis before lethal attack in Syria.”  
The Mirror. 23 September 2015. http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/suicide-bomber-bursts-tears-
comforted-6497847  
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• The required organizational support and encouragement for the individual to go 
through with the attack 
• The notion of national identity, or lack thereof, and the transnational (or 
supranational) component of modern suicide bombing campaigns 
• The decision-making of the suicide bomber himself—his inner conflict and 
emotions 
• The cult of martyrdom, to recruit future volunteers to replenish the arsenal 
• The motivational power of sacred values  (jihad, martyrdom) substantiating the 
act of martyrdom 
 
More suicide attacks occurred in 2014 than in any previous year.  The 
University of Chicago’s Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST) open source 
database registered 545 suicide attacks in 2014, beating the previous high of 525 in 
2007.2  The University of Maryland’s Study of Terrorism and the Response to 
Terrorism (START) records a whopping 738 suicide attacks in 2014.3  The Institution 
for National Security Studies of Tel Aviv records increases in suicide attacks from 2013 
to 2014 in the following countries: Iraq (177%), Yemen (190%), Lebanon (333%, from 
3 to 13), Afghanistan (94%), Nigeria (937%, from 3 to 32), and Libya (1000%, from 1 
to 11).4  Figure 1 below represents the dramatic increase in suicide attacks by year, 
displayed by target type (Total, Security-Military, Security-Police, Government, 
Civilian, and Informal Groups, which are attacks against competing insurgent groups).   
The number of suicide attacks in Iraq in 2014 was the highest since 2008 and 
accounted for 45 percent of all such attacks in the world.  As radicalized fighters return 
from conflicts abroad, many have been primed for suicide missions—and can bring that 
                                                 
2 Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST). 2015. Suicide Attack Database (September 30, 
2015 Release). [Data File]. Retrieved from http://cpostdata.uchicago.edu/ 
3 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2015). Global 
Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 
4 Schweitzer, Yoram, and Ariel Levin, Eian Yogev.  “Suicide Attacks in 2014:  The Global Picture.”  The 
Institution for National Security Studies.  INSS Insight No. 653, January 6, 2015.  
http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/No.%20653%20-
%20Yoram,%20Ariel,%20and%20Einav%20for%20web522242107.pdf (Accessed 17 October 2015).  1. 
3 
mindset and institutional knowledge back home.  Europol estimates that 3,500 to 5,000 
jihadists returned to Europe from the conflict in Syria.5  Suicide terrorism is not going 
away, as demonstrated by the October 2015 suicide attacks in France, the March 2016 
suicide attacks in Belgium, and the continued suicide bombing campaigns in Iraq, Syria, 
Afghanistan, and Nigeria.   
Figure 1 –Global Suicide Attacks, by Target, by Year, All Time 
 
                                                 
5 Dearden, Lizzie.  “ISIS:  Up to 5,000 Jihadists could be in Europe after Returning from Terror 

















































































In terms of effective kill rate, the suicide bomb is one of the most devastating 
attacks an organization can conduct.  Suicide bombings kill more civilians than any 
other terror attack, including Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), with an average of 
twelve killed per attack.  The conventional terrorist incident only kills one person per 
attack.6  The leader of Al Qaeda, Ayman Zawahiri, describes the suicide bomb as the 
“most successful in inflicting damage on the opponent and the least costly in terms of 
casualties among the Mujahedeen.”7  Because of these characteristics, suicide bombing 
campaigns present a difficult challenge to security forces, particularly when these forces 
must provide security to soft targets.  The second order effects of terrorifying the enemy 
populace, which is the political center of gravity among democracies, increases its 
viability as a tool.   
The purpose of this paper is to answer why individuals will voluntarily kill 
themselves to kill civilians, and in doing so, explain the dramatic rise in suicide attacks 
beginning in 2000.  No model to explain suicide terrorism will work if it ignores the 
method of payload delivery.  A suicide attack, by definition, is one in which the tactic 
succeeds only through the intentional suicide of the attacker.8  Suicide terrorism 
                                                 
6 Hafez, Mohammed M. Suicide Bombers in Iraq the Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom. Washington, 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007. 9 
7 “Part 11 of New Book by Egyptian Islamic Jihad Leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri.”  Open Source Center.  
December 12, 2001.  GMP2001121200008. 
8 Assaf Moghadam in "Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique 
of Dying to Win" (710) describes this tension in the discourse  between suicide attack as an act of war 
and suicide attack as an act of terrorism.  His discernment between the two is the characteristic of the 
target.  It is an act in war if the target is a combatant (military target), it is an act of terrorism if the target 
is a noncombatant (civilian target).  The dilemma in developing a theory for suicide terrorism is that 
hybrid organizations that have regular formations and terrorist cells operating among the masses use the 
tacti, and these groups use it to some varying degree against both military targets and civilian targets. The 
groups using the tactic do not make it easy for outsiders to dileneate between “war” and “terrorism” other 
than assessing on a group by group basis the varying use against targets. 
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conflates two separate moral acts—murder and suicide.9  Thus, to explain the 
phenomenon, we must incorporate the decision making of the individual to transgress 
two separate moral boundaries.   
In suicide terrorism, there are five motives why an individual will kill himself 
and kill others.  These motives may overlap to some degree, but they cover a spectrum 
of external to internal drivers.  The first external driver is coercion.  Some suicide 
bombers are forced by the organization to conduct a suicide attack.  The Kurdistan 
Worker’s Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) conscripted 
their respective bombers, and those who would not go through with the act would be 
ostracized from the community.10  The second motive is financial incentive.  In the 
early 2000s, Iraqi’s Saddam Hussein funneled money from the United Nations (UN) 
oil-for-food program intended to feed Iraqi civilians to the families of Palestinian 
suicide bombers, with payments to each family between $15,000-25,000.11  Thus, some 
Palestinians likely choose to become a martyr in able to help their struggling families.  
The third motive is revenge, which straddles external and internal drivers.  For example, 
one female Chechen martyr conducted a suicide attack near the Russian military unit 
responsible for the torture and death of her husband.12  Similar stories can be found in 
other suicide bombing campaigns.  The fourth motive is to escape from life.  Some 
                                                 
9 Lewis, Jeffrey William. The Business of Martyrdom: A History of Suicide Bombing. Annapolis, Md: 
Naval Institute Press, 2012.  43. 
10 International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (Israel), and Interdisciplinary Center (Hertseliyah, 
Israel). Countering Suicide Terrorism An International Conference: February 20-23, 2000, Herzliya, 
Israel. Herzliya, Israel: International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, 2001.  113. 
11 Grace, Francie.  “Saddam’s Suicide Bomb Funds.”  CBS News. 17 November 2004. 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/saddams-suicide-bomb-funds/  
12 Reuter, John.  “Chechnya’s Suicide Bombers:  Desperate, Devout, or Deceived?”  The American 
Committee for Peace in Chechnya.  September 16th, 2004.  11. 
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suicide bombers may have been suffering from major depression disorder, and used the 
martyrdom narrative as a socially acceptable means to commit suicide.13 
The focus of this paper is on the fifth group—those bombers that are inspired by 
an ideologically driven narrative that encourages and incentivizes murder-suicide.  
These true believers may be influenced by underlying psychological drivers, but these 
drivers are not necessarily depression nor suicidal thoughts.  The psychological drivers 
become intertwined with the sacred values of the ideology, to the extent that the 
individual’s needs and the needs of his perceived in-group are one and the same.  This 
paper reviews research on social identity theory, intergroup hostility, suicide ideation, 
and the history of suicide terrorism’s most influential organizations in order to explain 
how ideology influences the individual’s will to become a suicide bomber. 
Understanding the individual logic of suicide terrorism is vital to completely 
explaining the use of the tactic.  The organization’s political objectives, the role of 
culture, and the functional capabilities of the tactic in asymmetric warfare are important 
as well.  But no explanation is complete unless it can address why the individual goes 
through with murder-suicide.  The acknowledgement of the fifth group is important 
because measures can mitigate the other four groups.  Coerced bombers are dependent 
entirely on the organization—defeat the organization, and the tactic is defeated.  For 
example, there has not been a suicide attack in Sri Lanka since the Sri Lankan 
government defeated the LTTE militarily, specifically after the death of the LTTE 
leader Villapai Prabhakharan.  Interdiction on external financial support can reduce the 
number suicide attacks among those motivated.  If occupying forces do not wantonly 
                                                 
13 Lankford, Adam.  2010.  "Suicide Terrorism as a Socially Approved Form of Suicide".Crisis: The 
Journal of Crisis Intervention and Suicide Prevention.  31, no.  6: 287-289. 
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kill innocent civilians, then the revenge motive is reduced across a potential segment of 
the population.  Albeit challenging, similar interventions are available to identify and 
assist depressed individuals that may seek to identify with a violent cause to fulfill a 
death wish.  The fifth group, however, are difficult to mitigate.  They are intractably 
opposed to a global system that is inimical to their self-selected identity, and there will 
likely always been an organization seeking to act on behalf of that ideology. 
Suicide terrorism relates to two similar concepts in combat—suicide missions, 
and the intentional targetting of civilians—but conflates them into one act executed by 
individuals at the behest of non-state entities.  Suicide missions in traditional warfare do 
not specify the manner of death.  These missions gamble with life, but do not guarantee 
it.  A soldier may fight to the death in a blaze of glory at the hands of the enemy, but in 
a suicide attack, he dies at his own hand.  The only suicide attacks in military history 
compared to modern suicide bombing campaigns are the Japanese kamikaze attacks in 
World War II, which I discuss in Chapter 3.  
Secondly, whereas civilians have been targetted in conventional war—such as 
the reciprocal bombing of civilians among participants in World War II (such as the 
attacks on London and Dresden) and the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—
military objectives of nation-states to defeat the enemy’s capability to sustain protracted 
warfare overlapped with psychological warfare.  Nonstate entities practice suicide 
terrorism, and the prime or exclusive objective is to conduct psychological warfare 
against the populace.  A reasonable historic comparison to the murder component of 
suicide terrorism is the dehumanization of out-groups that has led to mass violence and 
subjugation of those deemed inferior to the in-group in power.  This includes the ethnic 
8 
caste system of Nazi Germany, the class and politics based system of the USSR, and the 
race based subjugation of Africans in slavery.  An ethnic or political based narrative 
positioned in-groups and out-groups in such a way that resulted in dehumanization of 
the out-group, which makes it easier to kill and brutalize the out-group.  The ideology 
behind modern suicide terrorism influences its adherents to dehumanize large groups of 
people in a similar manner. 
The Three Cognitive Components for the Self-Selected Bomber 
Both the dramatic rise in suicide attacks the past fifteen years and the 
willingness of individuals to commit murder-suicide result from three components: the 
narrative that leverages sacred values to describe the ideal in-group and why the out-
group is the enemy, the psychological consequences of the in-group and out-group 
divide that incites dehumanization of the out-group, and the narrative of martyrdom that 
removes the fear of suicide.  With some rare exceptions, the ideology of Qutbism 
influences all modern suicide bombing campaigns.  Qutbism is the ideology of the 
militant Salafist writer Sayyid Qutb, whose seminal work Milestones is cited by Al 
Qaeda leaders.   
Al Qaeda and its like-minded franchises have used Qutb’s group categorization 
to justify a wide range of acceptable targets.14  Qutb never argued for martyrdom 
operations—he was executed fifteen years before the first suicide bomb—but the 
Qutbist worldview creates a small in-group and a very large out-group.  The Qutbist 
worldview presents a framework where the “them” represents nefarious forces beyond 
                                                 
14 I use the term Qutbism to describe the value of militancy that has defined the use of suicide terrorism 
since the late 1990s.  Others have called this Islamic militancy, Islamic radicalism, or Salaf-jihadists, but 
I choose Qutbism for two reasons:  first, it is not fair to Islam to paint the tactic with such a broad brush, 
and second, it is not fair to Salafists, many of whom are pacifists and opposed to the antics of Al Qaeda 
and ISIS.  All Qutbists are Salafists, but not all Salafists are Qutbists.   
9 
simply being an Iraqi Shia or American civilian.  To explain the psychological impact 
of a strident in-group and out-group divide on intergroup hostility, I pull upon research 
from social identity theory to demonstrate that strong in-group narcissism incites 
individuals to harm representatives of the out-group.  
The sacred values that lay the foundation for the Qutbist narrative orient the 
individual to a strident new in-group identity.  Anthropologist Scott Atran defines 
sacred values as foundational beliefs about community, honor, justice, religion, and 
similar core beliefs that provide collective identity to the in-group and personal meaning 
to the group members.15  Individuals and groups view these sacred vales as morally 
inviolable, and act on them beyond what external observers may view as rational cost-
benefit analyses of success in political, military, or economic endeavors.16  
Compromising on these values is a compromise of identity.  Thus, Atran categorizes 
agents as rational actors and devoted actor.17  Groups and individuals can be a mix of 
both, but the units of analysis involved in suicide terrorism reveal a divide between the 
organization and the individual.  The organization primarily is a rational actor acting on 
sacred values to achieve tangible political objectives, while the individual is a devoted 
actor acting on sacred values to achieve intangible objectives in this life and the next.  
In a suicide bombing campaign, the rational actor needs an arsenal of devoted actors. 
Sacred values structure the world and give it meaning, thus shaking these values 
challenge the worldview itself.  These values are the rationale for strategic end-states, 
                                                 
15 Atran, Scott and Robert Axelrod. “Reframing Sacred Values.” Negotiation Journal (Harvard), 2008, 
24, pp.221-246.  222.   
16 Atran, Scott.  “Moral Imperatives and Democratic Dynamics in the Fight Against AQAP.”  In 
Chapman, Abigail and Janice Adelman.  Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations Pilot Effort: Focus 
on Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment Office.  2011.  58. 
17 Atran, Scott and Robert Axelrod. 224.   
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objectives, and even the viable tactics to achieve those objectives.  ISIS’ suicide 
bombing campaign against civilians is the product of how the Qutbist narrative contorts 
selected sacred values from Islam.  The world outside of pure Sunni Islam is Jahiliyya 
(“ignorance,” jahil as adjective).  All regimes in the world are jahil, and those who 
participate in the continuation of ignorance are like the pagan tribes that persecuted the 
Prophet Mohammed.  Many so-called Muslims are kuffar (“infidels,” takfir is the 
accusation of being an unbeliever), and are worse than non-believers.  The ideal identity 
one can have is shaheed (“witness” or martyr, those killed in battle), on behalf of jihad 
(struggle in the name of God), against the kuffar and jahil regimes.  Thus, the quickest 
way to actualize the benefits of martyrdom in the name of jihad is the martyrdom 
operation, the name Qutbists give for suicide attack.  Qutbism is unique in that these 
sacred values are not necessarily inherited from the individual’s upbringing.  
Radicalized individuals choose Qutbism, often renouncing the values of their family for 
a new separate identity.   
When internalized sacred values become vital needs to the individual, the 
violation of those sacred values contribute to the willingness of an individual to attempt 
suicide.  Suicidologist Edwin Shneidman identified psychache (unbearable 
psychological pain) as an integral component for a successful suicide.  Psychache is the 
pain that results from the perceived discrepancy between the individual’s vital needs 
and his ability to fulfill those needs in the present and future.  What is considered a vital 
needs may vary from individual to individual—they include getting married, becoming 
a parent, receiving acceptance from loved ones, a sense of achievement, career 
11 
success—but they are foundational to the identity of the individual and his place in the 
world.18   
Atran’s definition of sacred values and Shneidman’s vital needs overlap in the 
mind of the true believer.  If the individual has internalized the sacred values of his in-
group as his vital needs, and political realities violate those sacred values, then the 
individual may experience psychache on behalf of his community, nation, or religion.  
He internalizes the shaming of his in-group at the hands of the out-group, and view 
murder-suicide as a means not only to combat the enemy but to escape from the 
psychache caused by his immersion in the group identity.  One Syrian said that his 
emotional trauma at American actions at Abu Ghraib drove him to become a suicide 
bomber in response to the shaming of his people.19  The lack of a pure Islamic State for 
the Islamic Ummah (the collective community for all Muslims) may lead to psychache 
among true believers that have internalized this discrepancy between what should be 
and what is, and how the out-group has suppressed the fulfillment of a sacred value. 
The heavenly rewards for martyrdom mitigates the fear of suicide.  The cultural 
context surrounding the suicide bombing campaign in Palestine, particularly during the 
Second Intifada (2000-2005), created a cult of martyrdom that celebrated the martyr and 
promoted individual heavenly rewards for suicide.  Whereas previous suicide 
campaigns would allude to some form of immortality, the Palestinian experience—
borne of the complex politics and collective frustration with Israeli occupation—created 
                                                 
18 Psycache is one of three components in Shneidman’s cubit model of suicide.  The other two are stress 
(external pressure) and perturbation (perceived constriction of options for alleviating stress and 
psychache).  When the individual has high stress, high perturbation, and high psychache, suicidal thought 
and attempt is likely.  Ellis, Thomas E. Cognition and Suicide: Theory, Research, and Therapy. 
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2006.  41. 
19 Hassan, Riaz. Life As a Weapon: The Global Rise of Suicide Bombings. London: Routledge, 2011.  56. 
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an incentivization for suicide that would be exploited outside the Palestinian conflict.  
Death for the cause was no longer a sacrifice, but an investment.  Global and online 
media disseminated the cult of martyrdom to inspire individuals removed from the 
trauma in Palestine to become martyrs themselves.  Saudis, Libyans, Syrians, and other 
fighters would cite the same themes from the cult of martyrdom as incentives to go into 
Iraq to kill Iraqi Shia civilians.   
These two narratives—Qutbism’s small in-group and large out-group, and the 
over-emphasis of heavenly rewards from the Palestinian experience—converged into 
the most devastating suicide bombing campaign the world has seen, ISIS’ assault on 
Iraqi civilians that started two years after coalition forces invaded Iraq.  ISIS heavily 
relied on self-selected volunteers from Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria, and Morrocco, 
countries not directly connected to the coalition occupation in Iraq.  These volunteers 
targeted civilians more often than any campaign other than the Palestinian groups 
against Israeli targets.  ISIS is responsible for most of the attacks in Iraq since 2003, and 
approximately 38% of all suicide attacks across the globe have occurred in Iraq.20 
The Cognitive Terrain 
The cognitive terrain is the individual’s imagined nation.  It defines the 
characteristics of the in-group and the parameters of the group’s expected political 
control in reality.  Idealism is intrinsic to the cognitive terrain.  The pure imagined 
nation embodies important sacred values that current nations fail to uphold, which 
means any sacrifice is necessary to make the translation between ideas and reality.  If 
the sacrifice leads to heavenly rewards in the afterlife, then the sacrifice is even easier to 
                                                 
20 Based on START data.  Afghanistan and Pakistan are responsible for 22 and 11 percent respectively, 
meaning approximately 71% of all suicide attacks have occurred in those three countries. 
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make.  By emphasizing the sacred values as cognitive signposts of an ideology, we can 
identify the reflective beliefs that structure the rationale of militant groups and 
individuals. What distinguishes the cognitive terrain from nationalism is that the in-
group identity of the cognitive terrain is self-selected and universal in its political 
consequences instead of an inherited national identity with local political emphasis.  
The entire global system plays a positive or negative role for the in-group—usually 
negative—and individuals acting on this belief seek to remake the world. 
In suicide terrorism research, cognitive occupation refers to the perception 
among rebels that the international system and its powerful sponsors suppress the 
existence of a new state that best upholds critical sacred values for man.  If there is a 
cognitive occupation on the minds of individuals and true believers, the cognitive 
terrain is the counter that is being occupied.  The cognitive terrain represents the 
interaction between the sacred values of the imagined nation and the vital needs of the 
individual that drive action.  It then addresses the three cognitive components for 
murder-suicide.  
The cognitive terrain builds upon Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities.  
Anderson explains how nationalism emerged from the shared belief that individuals 
living in separate villages and towns are actually connected into one larger in-group.  
This cognitive connection forms the belief across individuals that they are a people, and 
in turn the people becomes a nation.21  Any bad event or tragedy that impacts one 
impacts all within the umbrella of the nation.  Although a thorough review of 
Anderson’s thesis is beyond the scope of this paper, Anderson’s argues that literacy 
                                                 
21 Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
London: Verso, 2006.  36. 
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drove this shared belief, as individuals could read the same newspapers and books and 
conceive that others are sharing the same thoughts.  In social cognition, the Theory of 
Mind states that since we know we have thoughts, we can imagine that others have 
thoughts as well.  Thus, an individual reads the same literature as others do, and infers 
that the others are thinking the same thoughts.  They mutually imagine a shared 
cognitive experience that connects individuals across time and space.  
Although Anderson’s Imagined Community and the cognitive terrain are related, 
there are five key distinctions which require a new concept to describe radicalism and 
by extension suicide terrorism.  First, the term terrain refers to the implication of this 
shared identity on local, national, and global politics.  Describing how a shared national 
identity is culturally constructed is one thing, but the identity must be assessed in terms 
of its political consequences.  A group that represents an imagined community is likely 
going to act on its behalf at the expense of the current governing authority.  The scope 
of the group’s nationalist ambitions—the scope of the terrain—influences regional and 
international politics.  Some nationalist ambitions are accommodable to international 
stability, other nationalist ambitions exacerbate regional strife independent of the moral 
justness of their political end-state, and yet other nationalist ambitions are pernicious in 
both end-state objectives and the process to reach said end-state.  The Qutbist narrative, 
for example, aims to recreate an Islamic state that covers dozens of current nation-
states, which would destabilize the Arab-Islamic world.   
The second distinction is that the a universal narrative based on religion carries 
global stakeholder ramifications.  The universal component  in the Qubtist narrative 
differs from the constructed but organic nationalism of Anderson’s imagined national 
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community.  The “religious identity as nationalism” imagined community starts with a 
cosmic explanation of the in-group and its place in the world, and then assigns a 
national-politic from this expectation.  Anderson’s “nationalism as a secular religion” 
imagined community starts in the opposite direction, as a collective identity builds 
across villages based on shared language, which in turn becomes a form of secular 
religion.  The cosmic religious identity places the individual’s in-group across national 
boundaries and governments.  Not all universal nationalisms need to be centered on a 
religious identity, as Marxism influenced individuals to think in similar terms as 
Qutbism.  I discuss the similarities between the two ideologies in Chapter 2. 
The third distinction is that the cognitive terrain recognizes that sacred values 
are used to lay the foundation of the in-group’s characteristics.  The reason why 
cognition is a necessary component to understand suicide terrorism is that the Qutbists 
start with core beliefs first and then construct the national identity.  Nationalism may 
carry with it sacred values imbedded in the meaning of the national identity, but it is not 
a requirement.  There is no Qutbist in-group without sacred values.   
The fourth distinction is that terrain implies variation of those values within the 
decision making of the individual.  Just as terrain varies in height, so too does the depth 
of sacred values in the individual.  Not all individuals within an in-group are going to 
react to the sacred values of “honor,” “nation,” or “justice,” nor are they going to 
necessarily agree with the meaning of the values and how to implement said values in 
the real world.  Groups within a sub-culture can position and manipulate these values to 
inspire future action or rationalize past action.  Jihad means different things, and is 
prioritized differently, among devout Muslims.  A sacred value is not just a tenet within 
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a belief system but a transitive tool that connects the individual to his collective 
identity.  The value of martyrdom connects the bomber to the highest level one can 
reach in relation to submitting to God.  The value of jihad—as positioned by Qutbists—
drives individuals to connect to God through conflict.  Groups that pursue jihad transfer 
the benefits of associating with jihad, not just to the group, but to its members. 
The fifth distinction is that the depth of religious belief is almost always self-
selected and carries inviolable beliefs compared to nationalism.  The individual chooses 
the depth of religious belief based on how the belief meets underlying needs or how the 
sacred values attract the individual.  Justin Barrett, professor of cognition and religion at 
Oxford University, describes us as having two types of beliefs—nonreflective beliefs, 
and reflective beliefs.22  Nonreflective beliefs are intuitive beliefs earned through 
experience that require minimal cognitive effort.  We rarely know what these beliefs are 
or how to communicate them verbally, yet they are basic to cognitive functioning.  
Reflective beliefs are those we explicitly endorse and have derived from effortful 
cognitive processing and reasoning.23  In discussion of identity, reflective beliefs form 
the basis of our identity, our in-group, how we choose and define sacred values, and 
how we choose and define vital needs.  Because of this, they are more difficult to 
counteract than non-reflective beliefs.  The cognitive terrain represents and describes 
these sacred values that the individual has reasoned to be true and prioritized as 
cornerstones for his identity, and the reflective nature of these beliefs turns them into 
                                                 
22 A thorough review of Barrett’s work is beyond the scope of this paper, as he starts with building blocks 
of cognition and moves up to types of beliefs.  It is important to note that beliefs need not be religious in 
nature.  Barrett, Justin L. (2011-10-01). Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology: From Human Minds 
to Divine Minds (Templeton Science and Religion Series) (pp. 48-49). Templeton Press. Kindle Edition. 
23 The conclusions may be fallacious or based on poor information, but the conclusion of a reflective 
belief involves a rational and evaluative process.  The premises of reflective beliefs may be non-reflective 
beliefs, and non-reflective beliefs may have been a reflective belief at some point.  For example, learning 
how to drive a car. 
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strongholds in the minds of true believers.  Defeating the ideology is defeating the 
identity of the individual adhering to it. 
The Structure of This Paper 
In the section “Overview of Competing Theories” below, I discuss the role of 
organizational decision-making on suicide terrorism.  I do this through a brief overview 
of previous theories of suicide terrorism, which represent organization-centric, 
individual-centric, and integration theories on suicide terroism.  I also provide 
psychological explanations from Social Identity Theory (SIT) for how the socail 
categorization of a narrative leads to intergroup hostility, which in turn leads to the 
willingness to harm or kill members of the out-group.   
In Chapter 2, I describe the role of Qutbism in influencing the in-group and out-
group hostility of modern suicide terrorism.  In Chapter 3, I provide a historic 
progression of the tactic from its original use by the radical Shia organization 
Hezbollah, to the Marxist-nationalist groups in Lebanon that followed Hezbollah’s lead, 
and to the Marxist LTTE in Sri Lanka.  I do this to provide a contrast as to how 
Qutbism changed suicide terrorism.  The Shia Hezbollah originated the tactic, but the 
tactic’s most prolific and pernicious expression found a place among Qutbist 
organizations.  The gradual ideological transition to Qutbist suicide terrorism influenced 
the gradual transition to predominately civilian and police targets over military and 
political targets.  In Chapter 4, I discuss the operationalizing of Qutb’s ideology, 
particularly in Hamas, Al Qaeda, and ISIS.  I discuss the critical origin of the cult of 
martyrdom in Palestine, and how ISIS capitalized on the Qutbist ideology of Al Qaeda 
and the cult of martyrdom to conduct the most devastating suicide bombing campaign 
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in history.24  In Chapter 5, I summarize the conclusion of this paper and present brief 
policy recommendations based on the individual’s role in suicide terrorism.  
Appendices 1 and 2 include graphs on number of suicide attacks by era, by country, by 
target selection and by year. 
Social Identity Theory: The Role of Group Identity on Hostility 
The search for a new, superior, and satisfying social identity leads many 
alienated Muslims to embrace the elite in-group constructed by the narrative of 
Qutbism.  Researchers have turned to SIT to understand how and why individuals turn 
to a terrorist organization to find personal meaning.25  The purpose of this section is to 
demonstrate lessons from SIT that explain how a strong ideologically-based in-group 
identity influences individual cognition and decision-making, specifically how the 
identity leads to dehumanization of the out-group.  Any ideology can have strong in-
group and out-group consequences—in fact, any artificial in-group and out-group 
divide can lead to preferential treatment to the “us” at the expense of the “them.”  
However, Qutbism provides a selective in-group that possesses sacred truths, and casts 
a large swathe of disdain for the rest of world trapped in ignorance.   
Individuals derive a substantial portion of self-identity through association with 
in-groups.26  Evaluation is the core component of social identity, specifically evaluating 
the value of groups and how group membership positively impacts the individual.  The 
result is a system that stratifies which social groups are better, and why the individual 
                                                 
24 A historic review of suicide terrorism for all groups is beyond the scope of this paper.  This paper 
reviews the key suicide bombing campaigns that represent ideological influence on the tactic.   
25 Gill, Paul. 2012. "Terrorist Violence and the Contextual, Facilitative and Causal Qualities of Group-
Based Behaviors". Aggression and Violent Behavior. 17, no. 6: 565 - 574.  568. 
26 Brewer MB. 2007. "The Importance of Being We: Human Nature and Intergroup Relations". The 
American Psychologist. 62, no. 8: 726-38.  732. 
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should identify with the “good” group or why the individual’s current group is better 
than others.27  This reflective belief leads to positive distinctiveness, which is the 
personal esteem for aligning to a chosen religious, political, philosophical, or regional 
identity over others.   
Henri Tajfel and his colleagues researched how individuals would treat each 
other if aligned into arbitrary social groups.  His research demonstrated that simply 
categorizing individuals into two distinct but arbitrary social “tribes” could create in-
group favoritism.  In the minimal group paradigm, individuals allocate higher rewards 
to members of their own arbitrary social category compared to members in the out-
group.28  The criteria for social categorization are irrelevant.  If this is the case, criteria 
imbued with a powerful cosmic narrative can merely intensify affinity for the in-group 
and suspicion to the out-group.   
Narratives build the cognitive network that defines membership in the in-group 
and out-group and the meaning of each group to the individual.29  They define the 
sacred values that individuals should embrace and act upon, show how those values are 
connected to the in-group, and shows what the cosmic consequences of those values 
are.  These narratives underpin all religious, non-religious, philosophical, and political 
in-groups, and we, as individuals operate in multiple narratives with multiple in-groups 
at once.  Narratives also help the brain to function, as the brain needs models to process 
information—and often creates narratives out of need.30   
                                                 
27 Chapman, Abigail and Janice Adelman.  Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations Pilot Effort: 
Focus on Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment Office.  2011.  
15. 
28 Brewer, 727. 
29 Chapman, Abigail and Janice Adelman.  9.  
30 The Medio Prefrontal Cortex (MPFC) and temporal lobes activate the social cognition evaluative 
network—it becomes active when people perceive others, and it infers mental states of others. The MPFC 
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The first step of dehumanization is depersonalization.  Entitativity is the degree 
to which group members are seen as a single categorical unit.31  The member of an out-
group is not an individual, but an ambassador for “them.”  Ruminating about a person’s 
group traits (whether ethnic, religious, or national) makes those individuals more 
psychologically distant and, in turn, depersonalizes those individuals.32  
Depersonalization does not inherently lead to dehumanization, but there is no 
dehumanization without depersonalization.33  Thus, the Qutbist narrative categorizes 
people in groups, and processes each individual as a member of either the good group or 
the bad group.  The civilians standing around the bomber when he detonates are not 
individuals, but representatives of an evil out-group obstructing the creation of an 
Islamic State. 
Moral disengagement is a series of steps that individuals take to move past self-
censured morality.  The first step is the delineation between in-group and out-group, 
which results in depersonalization of members of the out-group.  The next step is the 
ideological framing of the out-group as grossly inferior to the in-group.  Ideologies that 
pit the out-group as the source of all that’s wrong with the world and the in-group as the 
salvation of man are particularly strong in group narcissism.   
                                                                                                                                               
associates the value of information into different parts of the brain to induce different emotions in 
response to the information, depending on the valuation of the information.  For example, when dealing 
with individuals dehumanized by a narrative, the MPFC processes the individual with the amygdala, 
which not only activates the “fight or flight” threat response, but also activates the “disgust” response.  
Thus, any narrative absorbed by the individual that has dehumanized an out-group merely rectifies the 
emotional fear and disgust when the individual thinks about that group.  See Dillard, James Price.  “Use 
of Narrative in Promoting and Countering Violent Extremism.”  In Chapman, Abigail and Janice 
Adelman.  Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations Pilot Effort: Focus on Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP).  Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment Office.  2011.  213-216.  
31 Carlston, Donal E. The Oxford Handbook of Social Cognition. 2013. 566. 
32 Carlston, 198. 
33 Gill, 568. 
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Group narcissism explains the steps for moral disengagement in the individual’s 
mind, which in turn contributes to dehumanization.  Erich Fromm defined group 
narcissism as a sublimation of individual narcissism.  Whereas his work is not based in 
cognitive research, recent research has validated the consequences of Fromm’s 
arguments on intergroup hostility.  To survive, nature endows man with a great amount 
of narcissism.  However, we need to cooperate with others to survive as well.  Thus, 
extreme narcissism, to the point that it deters cooperation, is counterproductive. The 
survival of a group depends on the fact that members consider the group’s importance 
greater than their own lives.34  Thus, the individual sublimates his narcissism into the 
identity of the group.  In prehistoric or premodern times, this leads to tribalism.  Since 
industrialization has mitigated much of the urgent tribal (or familial) connection to 
survive, the drive for social bonding becomes filtered into modern in-groups.  Fromm 
describes the consequence as: 
Individual narcissism is transformed into group narcissism, that the clan, nation, 
religion, race, etc., become the objects of narcissistic passion instead of the 
individual.  Thus, narcissistic energy is maintained but used in the interests of 
the survival of the group rather than for the survival of the individual.35 
 
Research shows that narcissistic in-group narcissism extends beyond national identity to 
trivial in-group identity such as university affiliation.36  Since group narcissism can 
                                                 
34 Group narcissism is often called collective narcissism or ethnocentric narcissism.  They refer to the 
same underlying concept.  Fromm, Erich.  “Individual and Social Narcissism.”  From Sadler, William 
Alan. Personality and Religion; the Role of Religion in Personality Development. New York: Harper & 
Row, 1970.  117-134. 125.  This observation is also found in Ibn Khaldun’s argument on asabiyya, or 
“group feeling” on social and political movements.  I discuss Khaldun and “group feeling” in the 
conclusion. 
35 Fromm, 121. 
36 de Zavala AG, A Cichocka, and M Bilewicz. 2013. "The Paradox of in-Group Love: Differentiating 
Collective Narcissism Advances Understanding of the Relationship between in-Group and Out-Group 
Attitudes". Journal of Personality. 81, no. 1: 16-28.  26.   
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extend to university affiliation, it can extend to religious, non-religious, and political 
group identity.   
The lens of group narcissism creates a unique reflective belief for the individual, 
a syllogism of superiority that leads to conclusions about the self and others.  The 
syllogism uses foundational sacred values that define the group and in turn transfer the 
quality of the group to the individual.  In these syllogisms, we use values positioned or 
perceived to be better than other competitors.  If the narrative provides sacred values 
that sanctify the in-group and by extension demonizes the out-group, the syllogism 
leads to particularly powerful conclusions.  For example, “Jihadists are Real Muslims.  I 
am a Jihadist.  Therefore, I am a Real Muslim (by extension, you are not a jihadist, 
therefore, unlikely to be a real Muslim).” “All Christians are children of God.  I am a 
Christian.  Thus, I am a child of God (…you, on the other hand.)” “Atheists are 
enlightened.  I am an atheist.  Therefore, I am enlightened (you Christians, though…).” 
“America is the best country.  I am an American, therefore I am the best…”  
Group narcissism influences the individual member to harm opposing group-
members that challenge the honor, pride, or value of the beloved in-group.37  
Researchers Golec de Zavala and his associates studied the relationship between group 
narcissism and hostility to out-groups.  In their social research and subsequent statistical 
model, group narcissism predicts both animosity to out-groups and the willingness to 
hinder the out-group from obtaining goals with unambiguous hostile intentions.38  
                                                 
37 Golec de Zavala A, A Cichocka, and I Iskra-Golec. 2013. "Collective Narcissism Moderates the Effect 
of in-Group Image Threat on Intergroup Hostility". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 104, 
no. 6: 1019-39.  1019.  I use collective narcissism or group narcissism depending on the source, but they 
are interchangeable. 
38 Golec de Zavala A, 1037. 
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Neuroscientists have identified how the individual binds to the in-group identity 
from two observable angles.  The first is limbic resonance.  Magnetic resonance 
imagery shows how individuals’ brain activities can become synchronized, which 
creates the mutual sensation among two or more individuals that they are 
interconnected.  Limbic resonance is an observable neural pattern that occurs when the 
limbic systems across two or more individuals mirror each other through shared 
experiences.39  Limbic resonance explains multiple social bonding processes, from 
falling in love, to deep friendship, or to any sensation of communion and unity with 
someone (or something) else, such as a religious experience or even a live concert.  This 
leads to belonging, and is one way that the individual feels connected to his in-group.   
At the chemical level, researchers have observed oxytocin as the hormone that 
strengthens in-group bonding and out-group hostility.  Oxytocin contributes to multiple 
types of bonding between individuals, including romance, trust, benevolence, and social 
categorization.  Dutch psychologists conducted a hormonal test on fellow citizens, with 
one group given an increase in oxytocin, and other a placebo.  Both groups were asked 
to react to pictures and cultural objects associated with the Netherlands, and then to 
pictures and cultural objects related to two out-groups, Arabs and Germans.  Compared 
to the placebo group, the oxytocin group demonstrated an increase in affinity with their 
own Dutch culture and increased antagonism to Arabs and Germans.40  So whereas 
oxytocin does increase the individual’s trust and love for his in-group, it also increases 
the level of distrust to the out-group.  Thus, when oxytocin is created through natural 
                                                 
39 Goleman, Daniel, Richard E. Boyatzis, and Annie McKee. Primal Leadership: Realizing the Power of 
Emotional Intelligence. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press, 2002.  48. 
40 De Dreu CK, LL Greer, Van Kleef GA, S Shalvi, and MJ Handgraaf. 2011. "Oxytocin Promotes 
Human Ethnocentrism". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America. 108, no. 4: 1262-6.  1262. 
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social bonding with an individual’s in-group, the increase in oxytocin strengthens 
connection with the group and increases animosity to the out-group.  Thus, the 
ideological categorization of in-group and out-group has psychological and 
interpersonal consequences. 
Overview of Competing Theories: Organization-Centric, Individual-Centric, and 
Integration Approaches to Suicide Terrorism 
Two themes reoccur when discussing the role of ideology in influencing group 
strategy and invidual behavior.  The first is the interaction between organizational and 
individual motive.  The organization may have practical political objectives to use 
suicide terrorism (rational actor), but religious fervor may motivate the individual 
(devoted actor).  Since suicide terrorism requires the individual, understanding the 
individual motive is as necessary as understanding the organizational logic.  When it 
comes to ideology, the organization may seek an end-state that is religious in nature, yet 
it calculates the means to achieve that end-state with political benchmarks.  The in-
group may not be the organization itself, but a broader identity that both the individual 
and organization act upon. 
The second theme is that there is no pure adaptation of ideology in the world.  
Ideological and pragmatic motives, at both the group and individual level, will interact 
to lead to the implementation of specific tactics.  The cognitive terrain is not meant to 
remove functional factors in suicide terrorism analysis, but to balance the functional 
with explanations for behavior that pragmatic political considerations cannot explain.   
The historic use of female suicide bombers represents this tension between 
ideological beliefs and pragmatism.  Originally, only secular or leftist oriented groups 
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(the LTTE, the Lebanese socialist groups, the PKK) sponsored female suicide bombers.  
Because Marxist ideology emphasized gender equality, the Marxist groups were 
comfortable with celebrating women bombers.  However, there was a functional aspect 
as well—female suicide bombers maximized the effectiveness of women fighters.  The 
female suicide bomber could kill as many as a male suicide bomber.   
Originally, the religious groups of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
forbade the use of female suicide bombers.  Sheikh Ahmed Yassin of Hamas declared 
anyone who recruited a female bomber as “breaking Islamic law.”41  Nonetheless, after 
the first Palestinian female suicide bomber Wafa Idris became a popular Palestinian 
icon, Hamas reversed its stance and sponsored its first female suicide bomber two years 
after Idris’ attack.42  Al Qaeda, which originally placed similar restrictions on female 
bombers, eventually marketed martyrdom to women as well.  Instead of being awarded 
the houris, the seventy virgins given to the male martyr in heaven, the female martyr 
becomes the “most beautiful angel in heaven.”43  
Although the primary focus of this paper is to explain ideological influence on 
individual decision making, the role of the organization is vital to a successful campaign 
as well.  No matter how much motivation an individual may have, he is unlikely to have 
the resources, operational intelligence, and logistical wherewithal to successful execute 
a suicide attack on his own.44  Both Hamas and the PIJ used three cells to conduct one 
                                                 
41 O’Rourke, Lindsey.  “The Woman behind the Bomb; Suicide Attacks.”  The International Herald 
Tribune.  August 5, 2008. 
42 Regular, Arlon.  “Mother of Two Becomes First Female Suicide Bomber of Hamas,” Haaretz.  15 
January 2008.   
43 Dickey, Christopher.  “Women of Al Qaeda.”  Newsweek.  December 12, 2005.  Page 26. 
44 United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan.  Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007).  
September 1st, 2007.  http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%202007SuicideAttacks.pdf  30. 
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suicide attack—one to gather intelligence on targets, another for recruiting and 
managing the martyr, and the third for preparing and transporting explosives.45  
There are three social components in a suicide attack—the organization, the 
individual participating in the attack, and the population that the organization attempts 
to represent.  In order for a suicide bombing campaign to sustain itself, all three 
components need to be in favor of its usage.  However, these three units may not be 
synchronized ideologically.  In some campaigns, such as the LTTE and the PKK, the 
organization coerces the individual to become a bomber.  In the campaigns that rely on 
self-selected martyrs, such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, the self-selected martyrs may not 
volunteer because they believe or understand the process to the political end state.   
The organization may conduct suicide attacks for a populace that finds it 
abhorrent, and the organization fails to garner support for sustained use of the tactic.  
For example, the PKK in the mid 1990s, the LTTE in the late 1980s through the mid-
2000s, and the Chechen rebels in the early 2000s conducted suicide bombing campaigns 
at varying degrees of length, success, and devastation—yet the death or capture of their 
leaders ended or suspended those campaigns.46  The death of Villipai Prabhakaran 
ended the LTTE suicide bombing campaign, the capture of Abdullah Ocalan ended the 
PKK campaign, and the deaths of Shamil Besayev and Omar Ibn Khattab undermined 
                                                 
45 Hafez, Mohammed M. Manufacturing Human Bombs. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 2006.  20. 
46 The PKK has resumed some suicide attacks since August 2015, however at this stage it is unclear if this 
is a sustained campaign.  The first incident on August 2nd, and Turkey has accused the PKK of conducting 
other attacks in Turkey.  See “Turkish Troops Killed in Kurdish militant 'suicide attack.'”  The Guardian.  
2 August 2015.  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/02/turkish-troops-killed-suicide-attack-blamed-on-pkk 
(Accessed 3 May 2016). 
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the Chechen suicide bombing campaign.47  This is different from Hamas’s campaign 
during the Second Intifada, Al Qaeda and its connected franchises efforts across the 
globe, and ISIS’s campaign in Iraq and Syria.  In the latter set of groups, the deaths of 
leaders did not end the respective suicide bombing campaigns.   
There are three types of theories on the role of the organization and the 
individual in suicide terrorism.  The first is the organizational-driven approach to 
understanding the adoption of suicide terrorism, the second is the individual-driven 
approach, and the third is the integrated approach.  All theories address the role of the 
organization, the individual, and the culture (the integration between the two, which 
stems from the respective population’s sacred values) in some way, yet each of these 
categories prioritizes one over the others, and in doing so, blurs the other components. 
The most recognized and cited organizational theory of suicide terrorism is 
Robert Pape’s nationalist theory of suicide terrorism, which he articulates in Dying to 
Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.  Pape argues that organizations conduct 
suicide attacks in order to force democratic societies to leave the lands perceived to be 
the occupied homeland.48  The presence of occupation forces induces desperate 
measures to expel occupying forces.  In Pape’s analysis, groups use suicide terrorism 
because it works.  In 1984, United States and French military forces left Lebanon after a 
series of devastating Hezbollah’s suicide attacks.49  The perception that Hezbollah’s 
campaign expelled superior military forces encouraged the LTTE, the PKK, and even 
                                                 
47 The Chechen rebels pulled fighters from neighboring regions, such as Dagestan, and after the defeat of 
the Chechen insurgency, those groups initiated their own campaigns against Russian targets.  However, 
the Chechen suicide bombing campaign itself was mollified by the defeat of its leadership. 
48 Pape, Robert Anthony. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random 
House, 2005.  4. 
49 There were many reasons with the US and France withdrew from Lebanon, namely the Lebanese 
President siding with Syria in the conflict over Israel.  The perception however is that the barracks 
bombing forced the US and France to retreat. 
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Al Qaeda to use the tactic for their respective ends.  This is the strategic logic for its 
adoption, as its usage will lead to a tangible political end-state for the repressed 
population.  There is only one ideological component—nationalism—that motivates the 
organization, the individuals, and the population that provides direct or tactic support 
for the tactic.  According to his statistical model, the existence of a democratic occupier 
over the homeland of natives that are a different religion of the occupier will predict the 
existence of a suicide bombing campaign at the statistically significant at .001%.50 
Thus, Pape’s theory suitably explains the conflicts in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Israel-
Palestine, and Turkey where national liberation is an obvious motive. 
His occupation-focused approach even explains—albeit through some 
contortion—the organizations heavily infused with religious rhetoric that seek to 
establish a new nation based on religious ideology.  For example, in 2005, ISIS outright 
declared its intent to instigate a civil war between Iraqi Sunnis and Iraqi Shias, which 
theoretically would unite the Sunni world against Iraqi and Persian Shia.  Out of that 
conflict, the united Sunnis would establish a new pure Islamic State that replaces all the 
blasphemous Arab governments in the region.  ISIS conducted a devastating suicide 
bombing campaign against Iraqi Shia soft targets.  There is a strategic logic to ISIS’s 
use of suicide terrorism on non-combatants, even though ISIS’s political end-state is 
based in the group’s religious beliefs.   
However, the complex strategy of attacking non-combatants with martyrdom 
operations in order to induce second and third order political consequences does not 
find itself in the videotaped wills of Iraqi suicide bombers or interviews with 
prospective bombers.  From 2005 through 2008, most of the Iraqi bombers were Saudis, 
                                                 
50 Pape, 99. 
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Syrians, Libyans, and Moroccans who entered Iraq to become martyrs by murdering 
Shia non-combatants.  These bombers’ wills cite the heavenly rewards given to the 
martyr and the value of killing infidels for the sacred sake of killing infidels as 
justification for murder-suicide.  With two moral boundaries crossed, it strains 
credibility to equate the individuals’ motives as nationalism across all suicide bombing 
campaigns—as Pape’s theory does.51  The desperate Lebanese Shia ramming his 
explosives-laden truck into a convoy of Israeli combatants is not the same as well-to-do 
Saudi traveling to Iraq to kill Iraqi civilians in the hopes that it might lead to a civil war 
that might lead to the creation of a new Islamic State.  The former guarantees the 
removal of a certain number of enemy foot soldiers from his homeland, regardless of 
whatever events happen next in the conflict; the latter offers no tangible military or 
political gain, only conditional consequences based on other factors, all for terrain he 
never travelled to before his act of martyrdom.   
The individual-centric approach seeks to explain why the individual decides to 
become a human smart bomb.  In The Myth of Martyrdom, Adam Lankford argues that 
suicide bombers are genuinely depressed individuals, using the martyrdom narrative as 
a morally acceptable way out from the stigma of conventional suicide in Islamic 
cultures.52  Although 60% of suicide terrorists did not appear suicidal according to 
Western definitions of suicidality, Lankford argues that cross-cultural approaches to 
suicidality show that some of the Islamic bombers may have been suicidal from non-
                                                 
51 Pape’s theory has been heavily criticized from different angles since the book’s publication in 2005.  
The role of foreign suicide bombers in the Iraq conflict is one of the most visibly cited reasons, as Al 
Qaeda in Iraq was led by foreigners, who in turn sent foreign-born bombers to kill Iraqi civilians, which 
leads to questions as to who was the occupier (Mohammed Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq, 89).  In 
Chapter 5, I briefly present some of the criticisms of Pape’s theory. 
52 Lankford A. 2014. "Précis of the Myth of Martyrdom…” 375.  He conducts psychological autopsies of  
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Western perspectives.53  Since there are strong cultural norms prohibiting suicide, the 
myth of martyrdom gives the suicidal the venue to commit suicide for a socially 
accepted cause. 
Whereas Lankford also argues beliefs exist to funnel underlying behavior and 
emotions, he essentially does the opposite of Pape.  Pape’s approach is top-down, 
organization-centric, and presumptive that the individual motive and the organization’s 
strategy are one and the same.  Lankford looks at suicide terrorism motives from the 
bottom up, as underlying depressive emotions push the individual to find honorable 
ways to escape life.  Lankford’s research is important because he calls attention to 
suicidal factors previous researchers have ignored, however it projects a small sample 
size onto thousands of suicide attackers.54  It also does not suitably explain the 
psychological factors leading to the murder component of suicide terrorism.  Both 
perspectives dismiss individuals’ perceptions of the world, of good and evil, of “us” and 
“them,” and how these beliefs interact with real world constraints to influence 
dehumanization and decision making. 
The integration approach attempts to bridge the organization and individual 
centric approaches, primarily through the role of the population and its culture.  In The 
Business of Martyrdom, Jeffery Lewis argues that suicide terrorism, the human smart 
bomb, is a labor-intensive technology that closes the advanced weaponry gap between 
the superior force and the rebel force.  The technology of suicide terrorism exists when 
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the three entities interact—the sponsoring organization, the individual willing to die, 
and the cultural constructs for martyrdom that connects the individual to the 
organization.55  All three are necessary.  The cultural construct of martyrdom completes 
the technology because it gives the individual the psychological safety to engage in 
murder-suicide.  The biggest challenge for suicide terrorism to spread across conflicts is 
how to convince individuals to willingly kill themselves.56  In some of these 
campaigns—the LTTE, the PKK—self-selection was not a dilemma, as they managed 
the payload deliverer through some form of physical or psychological coercion.  
However, among the Sunni groups, the martyrdom narrative based in perverted Sunni 
sacred values solved the problem of voluntary suicide, and allowed the tactic to 
proliferate from Palestine, to Afghanistan, to Iraq, to Chechnya, to Syria, to Nigeria, 
and to the foreign Sunni volunteers from the Western world that traveled to these 
regions to become martyrs.   
One of Lewis’ critical contributions is explaining the dichotomy between 
exogenous control and endogenous control of suicide terrorism.57  Exogenous control 
represents centralized control over the tactic, and the ability of the organization to 
manage the demand for the technology within the culture.  Endogenous control 
represents decentralized control over the tactic, as the organization receives influence 
from volunteers and independently managed cells to push the organizations to use 
suicide terrorism.  In the 1980s and 1990s, suicide terrorism organizations like the PKK 
and LTTE exercised exogenous control.  They manipulated and managed the bombers.  
Hezbollah and Al Qaeda practiced mixed control, recruiting some and receiving 
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volunteers.  But the Palestinian groups in the Second Intifada, ISIS, and Boko Haram in 
Nigeria represented the move to endogenous control.  The decentralized control 
exploited the public demand for martyrdom.58  The cognitive terrain approach is a 
refinement of Lewis’ work, identifying the culturally constructed sacred values 
(specifically, defined in suicide terrorism by the narrative of Qutbism) that inspire 
decentralized control of suicide attacks.   
Note on Eras of Suicide Terrorism and Categorization of Targets 
There are three main eras that structure the history of suicide terrorism.  These 
eras are the Era of National Liberation (1981-1992), the Era of Religious Nationalism 
(1993-2004), and the Era of Fitna (2005-present).  Fitna is the Arabic term for civil 
chaos, and the word I chose to represent the avalanche of suicide attacks the globe has 
seen since 2005.  Since 2005, suicide attacks have primarily targeted civilians and local 
security.  The development of Qutbist rebellion explains this transition in targets, the 
willingness of individuals to kill themselves and civilians, and the rise in suicide 
attacks. 
Throught this paper, I categorize target selection into five variables: Security-
Military, Security-Police, Government (including embassies), Civilians, and Informal 
Groups (competing insurgent or terrorist groups).  I pull data from START, which is 
based out of the Univeristy of Maryland.  The START database inherited data from the 
Worldwide Incident Tracking System, formerly of the National Counterterrorism Center 
and Office of the Director of National Intelligence.  The START database codes each 
suicide attack with one of twenty-one different types of targets, which provides a high 
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level of target granularity.  Target types in the START database include business, 
religious institution, utilities, and maritime, among others. 
In the Appendix, I chart the results of another database, the University of 
Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST) for comparative purposes.  The 
reason why I do not use CPOST data in the paper is because it creates only three 
categories for targets in suicide attacks: security, civilians, and political.59  If the 
insurgency aims to replace the host nation government, it makes perfect sense to 
conflate military and police targets into one security variable.  In order to build a 
counter-state, expelling or weakening all security forces from a region fits the objective 
of replacing the current state.  This is simple insurgency logic, independent of the 
ideology of the insurgency.   
However, if the insurgent is motivated to expel foreign troops occupying the 
country, attacking local police targets can actually retain the foreign presence to offset 
the loss of local police.  Attacking foreign military personnel fits within a nationalist 
explanation of suicide terrorism.  Attacking local police may explain overthrowing the 
current government, but does not necessarily explain nationalism unless the nationalism 
is revolutionary or transnational.  Thus, strategic objectives are conflated with the 
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targets—suicide attacks on police may be to weaken the new government and expel the 
foreign occupier, whereas suicide attacks on the military may only be to expel the 
foreign occupier.   
It is necessary to separate police targets from military targets for two interrelated 
reasons.  The first is that in many of these areas of conflict, foreign occupiers are 
military targets.  These include American, British, French, or UN forces with troops on 
the ground.  The security-police targets, however, only represent foreign forces if they 
are perceived as such by segments of the local population.  Police forces may operate on 
behalf of a government foreign entities support, but the police are nonetheless members 
of the nation, oftentimes the same ethnic group, and embedded in the local community.   
Secondly, conflating military and police targets misses the orientation of the 
perceived out-group on the part of the individual suicide attacker.  Killing foreigners 
from a different religion is comprehensible.  Killing fellow nationals that are from a 
different ethnic group fits within in-group and out-group hostility.  Killing fellow 
countrymen to overthrow the government is yet another motive separate from the other 
two, at both an ideological and psychological level.  Thus, when researchers build 
statistical models on the objectives of the suicide terrorist organization while using 
simple variable categories, the conclusions will be incomplete if foreign military targets 
and local police targets are treated the same.  An attack on Afghan police forces is 
modeled the same as an attack on NATO coalition forces, even if there are no NATO 
forces on the ground in Afghanistan.   
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Chapter 2: Qutbism, the Ideological Foundation for Twenty Years of 
Suicide Terrorism 
The Salafist Reaction to the West 
Qutbism offers a simple narrative that explains why Islam has been victimized, 
who the villains are, and what means are justified to counterbalance this status.60  While 
Islam and Western political values can coexist and various jurist branches of Islam are 
what would be considered liberal, Qutbism provides a pristine alternative to Islam’s 
comparative weakness on the global stage.  The rise of Salafism in the late 19th Century, 
the fall of the Caliphate after World War 1, the forming of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt, and the Sykes-Picot agreement that parceled Arab-Islamic lands into European 
colonial mandates contributed to the strident ideological position of Qutbism.  Muslims 
are to submit to God, and the Caliphate represents the authority of man’s submission to 
God in the political sphere.  With no Caliphate—no matter how flawed it was 
recognized for being in action—the direct connection to the state of Mohammad ceased 
to exist.  Western values such as nationalism, imperialism, and industrialization 
contributed to its defeat, which reiterated the positioning of “us” (Muslims) versus 
“them” (the West). 
Western modernization shamed the dignity of Arab and Muslim countries.  To 
devout Muslims unconcerned to the “shame narrative,” this meant little.  But the shame 
narrative led to cognitive dissonance, because the comparison between what should 
have been true (the truth of the Qur’an, God’s honor through the success of His people) 
and what was true (the comparative weakness of the Arab-Islamic World to the West) 
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was unavoidable.61  To compensate for this dissonance, there were two available 
responses.  The first was that Islam was still good, which meant the West was wrong.  
The second was that the way Islam had been managed for centuries led to the 
dilapidation and submission of Islam to the powers of the West.  Thus, the jurist 
systems that trained Islamic scholars into a civilized, adaptive, and liberal Islam (such 
as the Hanafi School), had in fact failed, and worse, were blasphemous.   
This broad response emerged in the late 19th Century as Salafism, a term coined 
by political activist Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and an ideology that influences many 
Muslims today.  Salafi refers to “early followers,” and represents the first generation of 
the Prophet that almost all Muslims (whether Sunni or Shia) view as the “Golden Age” 
of Islam.  Many of the early 20th Century Salafists had liberal tendencies, and their call 
to a return to early Islam was intended to present a unifying force in the wake of secular 
nationalism.  Scholars such as Rashid Rida admired the West’s successes and sought an 
Islam that could learn from the West while retaining Islamic core values.62 
In its more militant application, Salafism wipes the slate clean of all Islamic 
philosophical and jurist development since the early generation.  These developments 
are bida (“innovations”), which blaspheme the pure revelation of God.  The 
consequence is that normative meaning and positioning of Islamic values such as jihad 
(“striving in the name of God,” against the threats to one’s soul and/or against unjust 
governments), tawhid (the absolute unity of God in all spheres of life), and jahiliyya 
(the ignorant pagan world prior to the pure revelation from God) are dismissed in the 
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name of returning to the Golden Age.  The true Muslim must think of himself as 
fighting alongside Muhammad against the pagan oppressors in the 7th Century.   
For example, jihad literally means to strive or exert oneself in the case of God 
against an object or entity that is sinful, unjust, evil, or antagonistic to Islam.63  In the 
9th Century, jihad developed into meaning striving for God through self-improvement.64  
A few centuries later, the Sufi philosopher al-Ghazali codified self-improvement for the 
sake of God as the Greater Jihad.65  The Lesser Jihad is the violent fight against unjust 
governments and unbelievers, ostensibly in defense for the faith.  The Greater Jihad has 
been the normative approach to interpreting jihad in the Qur’an.   
The conflict over jihad between its normative and Qutbist interpretations results 
from the challenge of abrogation.  In all religious traditions, abrogation is the 
reconciliation between apparently contradictory beliefs through some justification that 
prioritize one belief over the other.  Most religious texts that span centuries have some 
contradiction, whether big or small.  In order to maintain theological cohesion, these 
contradictions have to be explained in some way that satisfies the common sense of 
believers.  For Christians, the verses on the Old Testament that prescript violence 
against Philistines or against sinners are abrogated, corrected, and superseded by the 
message of the Gospel.  For laymen, it’s easy to infer the final word on prescriptive 
morality through chronology, with the most recent revelation (the Gospels being more 
recent than the Levite Law) the proper behavior toward members of the out-group.  For 
Jews, the later prophetic books of the Old Testament and the rabbinic teachings in the 
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Talmud and Mishnah abrogate the ugly parts of the Torah (the first five books of the 
Bible).  Abrogation thus provides context for passages to the laymen.  In Islam, trained 
Islamic scholars and jurists play the critical role in explaining Islam to believers.  The 
jurists explain the nuance of the Qur’an—which is not organized chronologically for the 
lay reader to easily follow—in a way applicable to modern times.  Believers generally 
follow the legal school of their family, and may resort to a cleric of that school in 
requesting legal guidance over difficult modern social issues.66  One way the Saudis 
deradicalize captured Al Qaeda members is to place them in a program of formal 
instruction in Islamic history, jurisprudence, and practice.67  In other words, the Qur’an 
must be interpreted properly from the expert of Islamic historians, and not taken at face 
value where any verse that encourages jihad can be extracted to justify modern attacks. 
The role of the jurist means little to militant Salafists.  The militants embrace the 
view of jihad as expressed by Ribi, an early Islamic commander of the seventh century.  
As Arabs expanded eastward, Ribi gave Persian King Rustam a choice: “If you embrace 
Islam, we will leave you alone.  If you pay the poll tax, we will protect you.  Otherwise 
it is war.”68  There is no greater or lesser jihad—just expansion, with force if 
necessary.69  Qutbists elevate jihad to become a Sixth Pillar of Islam, on the level with 
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the Five Pillars of Islam that all Muslims profess.70  However, it is important to note 
that many Salafists themselves due not promote offensive jihad, and instead appeal to 
Da’wa, the nonviolent call to Islam, in order to spread the faith.  In 1920, the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt started to reinvigorate Islam as an ideological force to counter 
Western global intrusions.  The Muslim Brotherhood was the first formal and modern 
organization that attempted to implement and push for Salafist ideas.   
Qutbism 
Much of the ideological and theoretical development of militant Salafism did 
not occur until the 1950s, under the influence of Sayyid Qutb.  Qutb is to Islamic 
militancy as Karl Marx is to Communism.71  Qutb published two influential works in 
the early 1950s, Milestones and In the Shade of the Qur’an, the latter of which is a 
multi-volume commentary on the Qur’an that connects his ideology to specific Surahs 
(“verses”) in the Qur’an.  Milestones is Qutb’s Communist Manifesto, as it articulates a 
straightforward argument for why Salafist Muslims must embrace offensive jihad in 
order to create the pure Islamic community. In the Shade of the Qur’an is Qutb’s Das 
Kapital, a dense justification of the worldview and its philosophical underpinnings.   
In the Communist Manifesto, Marx pushed for a dictatorship of the proletariat to 
control economic resources and remove the bourgeoisie from power, but Marx never 
explicitly argued for gulags, show trials, forced starvation, and mass executions.  
Nonetheless, the ideology of Marxism created the “good” in-group (the proletariat and 
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the wise intelligentsia joining the right side of history) and the “bad” out-group (the 
capitalists, the West, the imperialists, and anyone on the wrong side of history).  
Marxist governments have used the dictatorship of the proletariat to justify its posture 
and violent actions toward the out-group.  Qutbism is to Al Qaeda and ISIS’ attacks on 
civilians, as Marxism was to the Baader Meinhof Gang’s attacks against civilians.  The 
difference between Marxism and Qutbism is that the latter pulls upon longstanding 
sacred values that provide personal immortality through death while fighting the enemy, 
which in turn incentivizes suicide attacks in ways Marxism does not.   
Qutbism bluntly articulates the core sacred values that guide, like stars for 
navigating, the reader into certain conclusions about the state of the world and what 
good Muslims must do about it.  Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) influenced militant 
organizations that practice violence against civilians while claiming to fulfill Qutb’s 
vision.  In Knights under the Prophet’s Banner, Ayman Zawahiri credited Qutb as the 
leader of the modern Islamic Salafist revolution.72  Qutb never argued for suicide 
attacks—conceptually, it only existed as Japanese kamikaze attacks in World War II—
and he never explicitly called for violence against non-combatants.  However, he 
categorized non-combatants as representatives of Jahiliyya (the ignorant pagan world 
outside of God’s pure revelation), he called for militant jihad against Jahiliyya, and he 
declared all who die practicing jihad against Jahiliyya were shaheed (witnesses to the 
faith, martyrs).  This categorization leads to a militant posture toward all members of 
the out-group and the sanctity in confronting everything the out-group represents.  
Organizations inspired to operationalize Qutb’s words—Hamas, Palestinian Islamic 
                                                 
72 Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom, 72. 
41 
Jihad (PIF), Al Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram—would make the connection between jihad 
against Jahiliyya and martyrdom operations against civilians.   
In the late 1940s, Qutb traveled to the United States to continue his studies.  
Some aspects of America he appreciated, but by and large, Qutb found American 
culture superficial.  American relationships were based on quid-pro-quo status building, 
the churches were overly sexed, and America as a whole was hollow and pernicious.  
He observed and experienced racism first hand.  He saw a black man beaten in the 
street.  In another instance, he and his Egyptian friends were not allowed to enter a 
movie theater because the owner thought they were black.  They protested, “But we’re 
Egyptians” and the owner let the “black” Egyptians in, but it was not missed that black 
Americans were not allowed.73  This along with other incidents led Qutb to conclude, 
“The Soul has no value to Americans.”74 
When he returned to Egypt, he found the worst aspects of Western culture 
infesting the Arab World—symbolized by Arab Nationalism and its vanguard the 
Egyptian President Gamal Nasser.  Qutb joined the Muslim Brotherhood, and Nasser’s 
security forces quickly arrested him for crimes against the regime.  From an Egyptian 
prison, he published Milestones, which has been cited by radical Muslims since.75 
Within the book’s given assumptions, Milestones explains what is wrong with the world 
and what the solution is.  It gives a purpose to alienated Muslims seeking identity, 
purity, and historic connection to seminal events in religious history.  The Nasser 
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regime executed Qutb on August 29, 1966, at which point Qutb was eager to be a 
martyr: “I performed jihad for 15 years until I earned this martyrdom.”76  
In Milestones, Qutb argues that the world outside of pure Islam is in a state of 
ignorance that has led man to a precipice.  To Qutb, the situation is desperate, with two 
destructive wars behind man and nuclear war possible.  Man needs the vital values that 
only Islam provides to save mankind.  Nationalism, capitalism, socialism, communism, 
and democracy failed to prevent past World Wars and will not prevent the next war.77  
I argue that the pivot point that encourages an intellectual to embrace the 
conclusions of Milestones is one’s disposition to the world outside of Islam.  Because 
Islam is not truly practiced by its self- proclaimed rulers, the world is in a state of 
ignorance, or Jahiliyya.  Jahiliyya refers to the pagan world in Arabia before 
Muhammad, when men worshipped idols instead of the one God.  Qutb affirms that the 
first generation of the Message, the Salafi, is the greatest in the history of man, without 
comparison in Islam or the history of man.  Since the Salafi fought pagan Jahiliyya, 
modern Muslims should emulate them.  If conquest is justified in days of the Prophet, is 
it not when Jahiliyya has the potential to be catastrophic? Qutb puts it bluntly:  
The whole world is steeped in Jahiliyya… [It] is based on rebellion against 
God’s sovereignty on earth.  It transfers to man one of the greatest attributes of 
God, namely sovereignty, and makes some men lords over others.  The result of 
this rebellion against the authority of God is the oppression of His creatures.  
Thus, the humiliations of the common man under the communist systems and 
the exploitation of individuals and nations due to greed for wealth and 
imperialism under the capitalist systems are but a corollary of rebellion against 
God’s authority and the denial of the dignity of man given to him by God.  In 
this respect, Islam’s way of life is unique, for in systems other than Islam, some 
people worship others in some form or another.78 
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It is now not in that simple and primitive form of the ancient Jahiliyya, but one that is 
worse than the Jahiliyya of the Prophet.79  Jahiliyya takes the form of claiming that the 
right to create values, to legislate rules of collective behavior, and to choose any way of 
life rests with men, without regard to what God has prescribed.  Qutb referred to the 
Nasserite regime—and almost all other governments, for that matter, as a Jahiliyya 
regime.80  Because of this, Islam and Jahiliyya are incompatible.  There is no “half-
Islam” and “half-jahiliyya”; the political ideologies of the West and Islam are mutually 
exclusive.  Thus, any country opposing the pure expression of Islam is Dar al-Harb 
(“The House of War”).81   
To save mankind from jahiliyya, aggressive and militant jihad is necessary.  
Qutb cites Surah 8:39 as the proper definition of peace “Fight with them until there is 
no more persecution, and all religions are for Allah.”82  Jihad must be worldwide and 
aggressive because the stakes are global.  Qutb positions the value of jihad as the tool 
for man’s liberation, to “secure complete freedom for every man throughout the world 
by releasing him from servitude to other human beings so that he may serve his God, 
who is One and Who has no associates.”83  By positioning offensive jihad in such 
moralistic and global tones, it makes the practice almost ideal behavior: 
[To] establish God’s authority on the earth; to arrange human affairs according 
to the true guidance provided by God; to abolish all the Satanic forces and 
Satanic systems of life; to end the lordship of one man over others, since all men 
are created creatures of God and no one has the authority to make them his 
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servants or to make arbitrary laws for them.  These reasons are sufficient for 
proclaiming Jihad.84 
 
Qutb, however, never specifically argues for how this jihad should take place.  Like 
many ideologues, the operational implementation of his thought would fall to others.  
Bin Laden attended Qutb’s younger brother’s lectures in Saudi Arabia, absorbed Qutb’s 
ideas, and sought to implement them.85  Al Qaeda took beliefs about the state of the 
world (everything is Jahiliyya), the state of the enemy (all who suppress a true Islamic 
state are not only the enemy, but in the way of man’s salvation), and turned them into 
an operational reality.  Chapter 4 covers Al Qaeda’s operationalization of Qutbism. 
Radicalization: Characteristics of Self-Selected Qutbist Martyrs 
Qutbist ideology explains the radicalization of individuals who do not have any 
underlying economic or emotional drivers for supporting terrorism.  Although the 
demographics of radicalization cover both suicide terrorists and standard operatives, 
ideology contributes to both the organizational outlook and the values of the individual 
willing to become martyrs.  Most of the September 11th attackers were not practicing 
Muslims prior to embracing the Qutbist narrative.86  In Marc Sageman’s research, only 
25% of Al Qaeda members were deeply religious when young, 67% were secular, and 
the rest were converts from Christianity.87  Sixty two percent attended university, and 
most have not experienced any trauma.88  Many of the captured fighters in Iraq and 
Afghanistan had left comfortable lives in the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, or Western 
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Europe.89  The radicalized individual is not a reflection of his culture and environment; 
instead, he embraces an ideology that is a reaction against his environment.   
Radicalized individuals are not psychotic, emotionally dysfunctional, or, with 
some exceptions, suffering from major depressive disorder.  In Driven to Death, Israeli 
psychologist Ariel Merari interviewed captured Palestinian combatants: 15 were failed 
suicide bombers and 12 were standard operatives.  Merari found that 53% of the would-
be bombers were depressed and 40% were suicidal.  Only 8% of the operatives 
exhibited symptoms of depression and none exhibited suicidal tendencies.90  This gives 
credence to Lankford’s theory that many suicide bombers are sublimating major 
depressive disorder and suicide-trajectory into the martyrdom narrative.  However, even 
if we take Merari’s data on captured Hamas bombers and project it onto ISIS’s 
successful bombers, 60% of failed bombers did not exhibit suicidal tendencies. 
The online dissemination of Qutbist propaganda exposed many individuals to an 
ideology that previous generations would not have been aware.  By 2008, Al Qaeda and 
its likeminded allies operated 5,600 websites.91  Army leaders in Afghanistan testified 
to capturing young insurgents who confessed to being indoctrinated online.92  Prior to 
September 11th, the primary method of recruitment and radicalization for al-Qaeda 
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members was through face to face interaction.  Since the Iraq war, the radicalization 
process occurs online.93  Radicalization has become increasingly homegrown in the 
West, with no formal operational connection with Al Qaeda.94  Recruitment is self-
initiated, and the Qutbist narrative grabs disaffected individuals looking for a just cause 
to connect.  Many recruits radicalized through online propaganda approached Al Qaeda, 
Hamas, and ISIS asking to be sent as human bombs.95   
Online radicalization does not make the radicalized individuals any less 
committed or passionate about the ideology.  The intensity of emotions formed through 
online communication compares to emotions developed in person.96  ISIS members in 
the field Skype with Muslims in Europe and the US, selling them on what belonging to 
the Islamic State means to the individual.  Once they enter the Islamic State, recruits 
have learned the depths of their capabilities to brutalize human beings, whether it is 
decapitating enemies or abusing sex slaves—all the while covering the television screen 
when women appear because viewing them uncovered would be inappropriate.97  
The struggle for educated and relatively prosperous Muslims in the West to find 
satisfaction in British, German, French, or American national identity is one of the 
drivers of radicalization.98  ISIS propaganda caters to this alienation, and markets the 
romantic idea of the Caliphate as a place for Muslims to belong after exposure to the 
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hollow West.99  Social networking forms a bond between the alienated and those 
already radicalized, creating a connection to the new in-group identity separate from the 
family’s nationality.  The global connection among alienated demonstrate that the ideal 
Imagined Ummah exists, and deserves its own government.100  
In Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, Oliver Roy describes what 
he calls the deterritorialization of Islam, which in turn, has created a crisis of identity 
for many Muslims in the West.  Two historic factors have influenced this crisis of 
identity—the first is the collapse of the Caliphate, which existed as an imperfect but 
nonetheless historic connection to the political establishment of Muhammad.  The 
second is the diaspora of Muslims to non-Islamic Western countries in order to pursue 
economic opportunities that do not exist in the Arab-Islamic world.101  Approximately 
1/3 of Muslims live as a minority in a post-industrial society that has rendered family 
identity and extended neighborhood values secondary to individual achievement.  The 
West’s “exaggerated individualism” only reinforces a sense of isolation for many 
Muslims familiar with a communal way of life.102  
The marginalization empowers the desire to envision a global Ummah that 
transcends the local Islam that has lost its currency as an acceptable social identity in 
the globalization era.  For second and third generation Muslims, the concept of “home 
country” makes no sense; they are no longer aligned with their family’s society of 
origin.  It is more satisfying, as a social identity, to join an imaginary Ummah than a 
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real country.103  The imagined Ummah increases in relevancy, mainly so disaffected 
individuals can connect to an in-group larger than themselves and their neighbors’ 
groups, while the generational Islam tied to specific jurist schools is less relevant.  The 
traditional means of interpreting the Qur’an, often tied to regional jurist approaches for 
extracting the Qur’an’s message for modern times, is abandoned in favor of a “fresh” 
reinterpretation of scripture.  Islamists have had more success among educated youths 
in the West with a secular background than those youths attached to the traditional 
school of their parents.104  In addition, an imagined global Ummah connects the 
Western Muslim to any oppressed Muslim elsewhere, and makes the victimization vivid 
and personal.105  This conflict over identity will create the pool of Western recruits for 
Qutbist organizations.  
For the radicalized, the Qutbist in-group operates in three tiers—the broad group 
of all Muslims (the Islamic Ummah), whom the Qutbists claim to act on behalf of.  
Within the broad group, there is the subset of Qutbists who believe they are fulfilling 
the sacred value of true submission to God.  Within the subset of Qutbists are the 
shaheed, the martyrs who die to advance the pure Islamic state.  The Islamic community 
acts as both an imagined nation and the out-group as needed.  If Muslims are being 
persecuted by the infidel, then the Qutbists must fight on their behalf.  If those same 
Muslims stand in the way of the advancement of a pure Islamic state, then they are 
kuffar and equally worthy of death. 
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Chapter 3: Historic Review of Suicide Bombing Campaigns 
The Shift in Ideology across Groups Led to Shift in Targets 
Qutbist organizations did not invent suicide terrorism.  The first suicide 
bombing campaigns started in the early 1980s as a tool for nationalist groups to offset 
the technological advantage of foreign occupiers.  The groups that originated and 
propogated its use were influenced by a mix of social justice and nationalim (in the case 
of Hezbollah) and Marxism and nationalism (in the case of the LTTE and the Lebanese 
Socialist groups).  This ideological foundation did the following—it limited the 
ambition of the groups to removing foreign troops on the ground, and it limited the 
stakeholders that identified with the cause.  This contrasts with the Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Chechen, and Syrian conflicts, which created stakeholders based on religion.  The latter 
conflicts received foreign fighters to fight and die for those respective causes based on 
the underlying religious overtones.   
As a tool in asymmetric warfare, the nationalist-oriented groups used suicide 
terrorism to achieve tactical advantage in military engagements.  Even the most 
dramatic and symbolic attacks of this era—the Hezbollah bombings of the American 
embassy in Lebanon and the American and French barracks in Lebanon—capsized the 
intelligence gathering capabilities of the US and France in Lebanon for years.  Thus, the 
ideological foundation of nationalism framed the use of targets as primarily functional.  
Military and government targets comprised 53% and 18% of the 38 global suicide 
attacks between 1981 and 1992.  The remaining target percentages were Police (11%), 
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Civilian (13%), and Informal groups (5%).106  The number of total suicide attacks (38) 
in the Era of Nationalism is small compared to the number of attacks in the Eras of 
Religious Nationalism and Fitna (467 and 3,290 respectively).  However, the 
ideological foundation of the originators of suicide terrorism and the trends in targets 
offer a contrast to how the infusion of religion into suicide terrorism expanded the 
number of attacks and altered the target focus.  See Table 1 below. 







































Attacks 1 1 5 2 15 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 
Military 0% 100% 60% 50% 53% 33% 0% 100% 50% 100% 50% 50% 
Government 100% 0% 40% 50% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 50% 
Police 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
Civilian 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 33% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Informal  
Groups 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
The second era of suicide terrorism, the Era of Religious Nationalism, represents 
the use of suicide terrorism by primarily Qutbist influenced practitioners Hamas, Al 
Qaeda, and the Chechen rebels.  The Palestinian and Chechen groups straddled religious 
end-state objectives with nationalist politics.  Suicide bombing in guerilla warfare 
became a tool in terrorism, with an increase in the intentional attack of soft targets 
across multiple conflicts.  Each of these groups pushed the boundaries of acceptable 
targets of suicide terrorism, justifying a step in one direction that a subsequent group 
would use to justify taking the next step.   
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The organizations practicing suicide terrorism had tangible political goals for 
using the tactic, yet the volunteers would cite religious reasons—and more importantly, 
rewards—for volunteering to go through with the tactic.  This would incentivize the 
individual to become a suicide bomber.  In Palestine, a cult of martyrdom sprouted that 
transcended the political objectives of the sponsoring organization, to the extent that the 
suicide bombing wing of Hamas (al-Qassam Brigade) would conduct attacks despite 
explicit opposition by political leaders of Hamas.  From 1994 to 2004—which includes 
a significant number of LTTE attacks and the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—
there were 467 total global suicide attack targets.  The total target breakdown for this 
era is: Military (24%), Government (14%), Police (13%), Civilian (44%), and Informal 
Group/Unknown (4%).107  Table 2 represents the breakdown of targets by year, and 
demonstrates how the spread of Qutbist ideological categories influenced the increase in 
civilian based targets.  



































Total Attacks 11 20 15 12 22 27 37 53 75 83 112 
Military 45% 40% 27% 33% 32% 11% 59% 15% 13% 19% 24% 
Government 0% 5% 7% 0% 18% 30% 22% 9% 5% 14% 21% 
Police 0% 20% 27% 17% 0% 22% 11% 9% 3% 7% 24% 
Civilian 45% 25% 33% 50% 45% 22% 8% 62% 72% 57% 28% 
Informal Groups 9% 0% 0% 0% 5% 4% 0% 4% 0% 0% 1% 
Unknown 0% 10% 7% 0% 0% 11% 0% 0% 7% 2% 2% 
 
The third era of suicide terrorism, the Era of Fitna, represents the rise of ISIS, 
the Afghanistan and Pakistan Talibans, the Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Al Qaeda 
                                                 
107 Unfortunately, the START database has no data for 1993, and to be consistent with the data source, I 
do not include 1993 in these assessment.  The CPOST database has 6 attacks for 1993. 
52 
franchises in Yemen, Syria (al-Nusra), and Somalia.  ISIS has been conducting the most 
devastating suicide bombing campaign in history since 2005.  ISIS combined multiple 
trends of the tactic up to this point: the strong in-group and out-group divide from 
Qutbism, the ideological objective to build a new government based on the pure and 
ideal religion, the dehumanization of non-combatants as takfir which justified the 
murder of fellow Muslims, and the cult of martyrdom exported from Palestine to 
incentivize the individual to commit suicide.   
































Total Attacks 203 173 359 242 178 170 202 401 624 738 
Military  26% 17% 18% 13% 8% 9% 11% 24% 28% 32% 
Government 15% 12% 10% 20% 32% 25% 29% 13% 14% 11% 
Police 20% 24% 33% 20% 8% 14% 22% 26% 28% 22% 
Civilians 38% 43% 36% 38% 46% 50% 34% 27% 25% 23% 
Informal Groups 0% 1% 3% 8% 2% 2% 1% 5% 3% 6% 
 
The organizations in this era have functional reasons for using suicide 
terrorism—the insecurity in Iraq and Afghanistan gave these groups the space to 
conduct attacks—yet even this does not fully explain why individuals were travelling to 
Iraq to become a bomber, why the organizations used suicide terrorism instead of 
conventional terrorist attacks, what type of government they are trying to create, and 
why that type of government attracts stakeholders from out of the region.  To 
understand the dramatic rise in attacks in this era, the ideological basis and individual 
internalization of this ideology matters.  From 2005 to 2014, there were 3,290 total 
global suicide attacks.  ISIS suicide attacks in Iraq represents 41% of all attacks in this 
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era, and 14% of all suicide attacks in this era targeted Iraqi civilians.  Table 3 above 
charts the attacks for this era.  
The Ideological Foundation of Suicide Terrorism in the 1980s 
Marxist and social justice values influenced the originator and early adopters of 
suicide terrorism, and this structured how these groups selected targets.  The LTTE, the 
PKK, and the Lebanese socialist groups adhered to Marxist rhetoric and worker’s 
revolution.  Although explicitly anti-Marxist, Hezbollah believed in a class 
consciousness similar to Marxist tenets, but this identification with the oppressed was 
rooted in Sunni oppression of Shias and not dialectical materialism.  Each of these 
groups adopted the tactic before Qutbist organizations did.  The purpose of a historic 
review of suicide terrorism is twofold: to demonstrate that no ideology completely 
monopolized the tactic, and to compare how Qutbist organizations changed the tactic 
and its usage in comparison to previous suicide bombing campaigns.   
The most notable suicide attacks prior to the 1980s were the Japanese kamikaze 
attacks in World War II.  In constrast to self-selected martyrs, the kamikaze pilots were 
conscripted, and they were used exclusively against American military targets.  Many 
kamikaze pilots wrote in their diaries the disillusionment they had with the cause and 
the fear for being selected in a kamikaze attack.  However, the Japanese government 
still appealed to Shinto and Buddhist values to justify the attack and encourage the 
conscripted.108  Secular-leaning organizations that conscript the suicide attackers, such 
as the LTTE, will also use religious values to assist in the individual to go through with 
the attack.   
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William Pierce’s Turner Diaries (1978) presented one of the most infamous 
fictional suicide attacks.  The “protagonist” Earl Thomas crashes a crop duster armed 
with a nuclear bomb into the Pentagon, which allowed the Neo-Nazi Order to take over 
the world.109  The Turner Diaries has influenced many white supremacists in the US and 
Europe, including those behind the 1995 Murrah Building bombing in Oklahoma City, 
yet there was not a rash of suicide attacks by white nationalists.  One reason is that 
Pierce and his Neo-Nazism was explicitly anti-Christian, which limited its roots among 
a broader American culture.  The fictional Earl Thomas renounced belief in an afterlife 
on his flight into the Pentagon.  Timothy McVeigh, like his fictional hero, described 
himself as an agnostic.110  Although there are multiple reasons why the white 
supremacist movement has not conducted both the conventional and suicide attacks to 
the degree that militant Qutbists have, one reason is because the substantiating ideology 
does not promise personal immortality, which is key to provide psychological safety to 
go through with suicide. 
Suicide terrorism in the 1980s emerged in the waning days of the Cold War, 
which explains some ideological restraint in its usage in the Era of Nationalism.  When 
the Cold War began, most rebel groups turned to the Soviet Union or Maoist China—
both results of successful revolution—as ideological beacons for their own nationalist 
and socialist movements, particularly since many were combatting post-colonial 
enterprises that usually aligned with the United States’ side of the Cold War.  In some 
instances, the USSR would send actual materiel to nationalist movements that paid 
obeisance to the left side of the global political spectrum.  But by the 1980s, the Soviet 
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Union ceased to be a motivating force for global revolution and rebellion, and Chinese 
Chairman Mao Zedong’s accommodation of US President Richard Nixon in the 1970s 
likewise betrayed revolutionary principles.  The LTTE, the PKK, and the Lebanese 
groups were the last remnants of rebel fighters adhering to an ideology that lost much of 
its motivating power.  In the 1970s, many of the transnational leftwing terrorist 
groups—the Japanese Red Army, the Baader Meinhof Gang, Carlos the Jackal—
targeted and assassinated bourgeois civilians whom they believed represented the 
collective oppression of the proletariat.  However, they did not conduct any suicide 
attacks, likely for three reasons: the tactic was invented after their defeats or deaths, the 
decline of Marxism limited support for the ideology outside of a few regions (such as 
Sri Lanka and Kurdistan), and, most importantly, the type of in-group and out-group 
divide is different in Marxism and Qutbism. 
Marxism can (and has) created stakeholders globally for its cause, and it can 
(and has) created rigid in-group and out-group conflict with horrific consequences.  The 
Soviet imposed Holodomor famine in Poland, the gulags, the show trials, the Cultural 
Revolution, and the Khmer Rouge are proof that Marxism can incite violent 
dehumanization.  The lessons of group narcissism on intergroup hostility explain 
Marxist violence as well.  The difference between cosmic Marxism and cosmic Islamic 
militancy is that, in Marxism, the potential in-group member is anyone who is 
oppressed, in any country in the world.  The exploited workers and their intellectual 
advocates are allies.  Thus, wanton attacks on civilians can theoretically undermine 
potential support for global workers’ revolution.  Capricious slaughter of civilians 
would merely push workers to rally around the former regime instead of the socialist 
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vanguard.  The in-group and out-groups are intermixed, making separating the out-
group difficult for a violent attack.  For Marxists, as born by history, the reordering of 
man (and its pernicious consequences) occurs after they attain power.   
For Qutbists, the in-group and out-group divide is easier to recognize and act on.  
The in-group and out-group are, for the most part, geographically and culturally 
separated, which makes it easier to target large out-groups without fear of 
contaminating the cause among the audience the Qutbists intend to win over first.  If an 
ISIS suicide bomber goes into an Iraqi Shia marketplace and detonates himself, 
everyone who dies is an infidel and worthy of death.  If a Marxist suicide bomber 
detonates himself in an American mall, he very well may kill many bourgeois enemies, 
but also many workers that the bomber is theoretically in his in-group.  If a Shia suicide 
bomber detonates himself in an American mall, he will kill many in the “House of 
Oppressed,” an in-group that the Shia radical theoretically identifies with (discussed 
below in Cognitive Terrain of Lebanese Bombers). 
The role of religious identity mitigates much of the fear of suicide and creates a 
framework for pulling adherents from over the globe.  Any stakeholder affiliated with 
the religion can self-select to defend the religion in any area where the religion is in 
conflict.  Thus, a Westernized Muslim in London can identify with what happens to 
Iraqis—to the extent that the Westernized Muslim, who has never been to Iraq, can kill 
himself and fellow Londoners.   
Hezbollah and Syrian Groups in Lebanon 
The first suicide bombing campaign emerged from the complicated social and 
geopolitical politics in Lebanon.  After World War II, Lebanon gathered four separate 
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religious groups—Sunnis, Shias, Maronite Christians, and Druze—into one country.  
The government was structured around a confessional system that ensured proportional 
representation for each group in different offices.  The major positions went to the 
Sunnis and Christians, leaving Shias and Druze with limited access to political (and, by 
extension, economic) resources.  Since Lebanon was a French protectorate between the 
World Wars, the political culture favored the Christians.  The Christians (primarily) and 
Sunnis (secondarily) benefitted the most economically from the confessional system.  
For decades, Lebanon prospered, as it was a haven of market economics in a desert of 
Arab socialism.  But in time, the social tension over the confessional system would take 
its toll and lead to a devastating civil war.  The Shia demographic increased 
dramatically in the decades following establishment of Lebanon, and thus the Shia 
community was at a permanent disadvantage in accessing economic resources. 
In 1970, King Abdullah Hussein I of Jordan expelled Palestinian activists and 
agitators from Jordan, who subsequently relocated to Lebanon.  The expelled 
Palestinians from Jordan militarized southern Lebanon, and in turn strained the tense 
social, economic, and political high wire act of Lebanon.  Syria invaded Lebanon in 
1975, primarily to stabilize it and create a buffer against Israel.  In 1982, Israel invaded 
to eradicate the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)’s bases near the border that 
shelled Israeli towns and to destroy the PLO’s political authority in the West Bank.  
Months later, the US and France sent ground forces into Lebanon to help PLO 
leadership escape to Tunis and to keep all combatants at bay.   
Between the Syrian and Israeli incursions into Lebanon, the Ayatollah 
Khoemeini and his allies forced the Shah of Iran to abdicate.  In the place of his pro-
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Western government, the Iranian revolutionaries installed a theocracy of Shia legal 
scholars.  These jurists represented the first beacon of Shia power since the end of the 
Abbasaid Caliphate almost a millenia before.  The new government took an aggressive 
posture against the Shah’s former allies, namely the US and Israel.  The Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard (IRG) found an opportunity to expand Iranian influence in the 
Arab World to counter US influence, particularly through Arab Shia communities.111  
Soon after the Iranian revolution, the Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini sent over 1,000 
IRG troops to Lebanon to train the local Shia in guerilla warfare.112  
The first suicide bombing campaign resulted from Iranian sponsorship, tied to 
Iranian strategic objectives in the region.  In December 1981, the Iranian-backed Shia 
group Al Dawa (“the Call”) drove a bomb-packed car into the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, 
conducting the first suicide attack in a sustained campaign.113  Many of the members of 
Al Dawa became members of Hezbollah (“the Party of God”).  In April 1983, a suicide 
bomber drove into the US Embassy in Beirut, killing 17 American CIA operatives and 
embassy staff personnel and 46 Lebanese workers.  Soon after, Iran ordered Hezbollah 
to conduct a “spectacular attack” against MNF forces.114  On October 23, 1983, two 
suicide attackers detonated their vehicular suicide bombs on the US Marine and French 
barracks within minutes of each other, killing 241 Americans and 58 French 
servicemen.  America and France were the two countries providing intelligence and 
materiel support, respectively, to Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war.  Twelve days later a 
                                                 
111 Reuter, Christoph. My life is a weapon a modern history of suicide bombing. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004. 57. 
112 Pedazhur, Ami.  Suicide Terrorism.  Malden, MA; Policy Press, 2005.  44. 
113 Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom.  Location 554. 
114Tyler, Patrick.  A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East--from the Cold War to the 
War on Terror.  New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009.  298. 
59 
suicide attack denonated on an Israeli convoy, killing 60.  In February 1984, the 
multinational forces left Lebanon.  Soon after, other Lebanese groups joined in using 
the tactic, and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka would follow. 
Cognitive Terrain of Lebanese Bombers 
Unlike Sunni militants, who prioritize jihad against unbelievers in the name of 
theological differences, the Shia militant conception of jihad emphasizes combatting 
oppression.  Sunnis divide the world by the “House of Islam,” where Muslims live, 
against the “House of War,” where unbelievers live.  Hezbollah, on the other hand, 
divides the world into “House of Oppressors” and the “House of the Oppressed,” a 
perspective formed from centuries of oppression at the hand of Sunnis.115  Almost every 
Hezbollah official speech has evoked this dynamic of oppressor and oppressed.  To 
radical Sunnis, Islamic identity is the top priority and social justice followed later.  To 
radical Shias, social justice is the top priority and Islamic identity follows.  Because of 
the oppression and oppressor narrative, the greater Shia “in-group” was not necessarily 
just fellow Shias but victims of tyranny anywhere.  Before the Iranian Revolution, Shias 
would identify with left-leaning parties and political platforms.116  The social justice in-
group perspective of Hezbollah would lead them to share tactics with left leaning 
groups and, leading into the next era, militant Sunni groups oppressed by Israel and 
Arab governments as well. 
Sympathetic Shia clerics developed a theological justification for the tactic.  Iran 
and Hezbollah coined the phrase al-amalyiat al-istishhadiyya for suicide bombing, 
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known as “martyr operation.”117  The Lebanese Shia theologian Ayatollah Sayyid 
Mohammed Fadlallah set the rules for Shia use of suicide bombings.  He argued, “We 
believe that suicide operations should only be carried out if they can bring about a 
political or military change in proportion to the passions that incite a person to make of 
his body an explosive bomb.”118  To Sheikh Fadlallah the aim “is to have a political 
impact on an enemy whom it is impossible to fight by conventional means, then his 
sacrifice can be part of a jihad.”119  Fadlallah did not emphasize the individual rewards 
of martyrdom; the reward was the advancement of the living cause. 
There was little that was religious about Fadlallah’s arguments, other than 
referencing and justifying jihad under certain political conditions.  He never used takfir, 
tawhid, or other religious values that Qutbists used in order to demonstrate the 
soundness of their actions according to the faith.  However, the messenger provided the 
sanctification of political objectives.  Because a sheikh approved, the tactic was 
acceptable.  All of Hezbollah’s targets during this era were military and political 
entities.120  In the 1980s, Hezbollah performed over 25 suicide attacks.121  However, out 
of 1,500 Hezbollah terrorist operations in the 1990s, the organization only performed 
two suicide bombings.  According to Hezbollah, they no longer needed martyrdom 
operations because they developed the infrastructure in southern Lebanon for a 
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paramilitary state.122  By the late 1990s, Hezbollah no longer even had a suicide 
bombing training program.   
The Campaigns of the Nationalist-Marxist Organizations in Lebanon 
In Lebanon, a second wave of suicide bombing campaigns followed Hezbollah’s 
initiative.  These participating groups included the Syrian Baath Party, the Arab 
Socialist Union, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Lebanese Communist 
Party, and the Nasserist Organization.123  The suicide bombers in Lebanon were not all 
devout Muslims.  Of the forty-one known suicide attackers during the Lebanese 
conflict, twenty-seven were from socialist or communist parties (even those who 
conducted attacks on behalf of Hezbollah), three were Christian, and only eight were 
Islamic radicals.  However, it is fair to note that many of Hezbollah’s attackers are 
unknown.124  Like Hezbollah, these groups primarily attacked military targets, as the 
SSNP insisted it was not a terrorist organization because it refused to target civilians.125 
 The cult of martyrdom, which would become a staple of the Palestinian suicide 
campaigns, started with these national-socialist groups, particularly through videotaped 
wills.  These tapes marketed the martyr’s reason for dying for the cause.  Jamal as-Sati, 
one of the Lebanese Communist bombers, addressed in his testament that he was acting 
on behalf of “the poor of the whole world.”126  Sati, however, came from a family of 
respectable means in the Beqaa valley.   
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The SSNP sponsored the first known female suicide bomber, Sana Mheidleh.  
On April 9, 1985, the 16-year-old girl rammed a car loaded with 440 pounds of 
explosive into an Israeli convoy, killing two Israeli soldiers.127  Although Mheidleh was 
Shia, she made no mention of religion as a motivation in her letters and recordings that 
announced her intentions.128  In her videotape, she declared this was her national duty, 
and she was glad to give her life for Hafez al-Assad.129  Mheidleh, who did not know 
how to drive a car before the attack, stated, “All my life I have been thinking of a 
revolutionary action.  I have decided to fulfill my duty toward the south.”  Mheidleh 
tied her sacrifice to national liberation on behalf of Greater Syria, a region that covers 
both Syria and Lebanon, as well as portions of Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey: 
When you see and hear me I will be dead.  I choose death in order to fulfill my 
national duty.  I hope I’ll be able to kill the highest possible number of the 
enemy…Do not be sad for me.  The south must be liberated. 
   
The SSNP dispatched at least five more female suicide bombers by 1990.   
Tamil Tigers Innovation, Adoption, and Use of Suicide Terrorism 
Tamil Tigers’ suicide bombing campaign shared underlying political factors 
with Hezbollah’s suicide bombing campaign, particularly in the role of sacred values 
based in nationalism.  One admirer of Hezbollah’s campaign was Villipai Prabhakaran, 
the tyrannical leader of the LTTE.130  The LTTE represented the Tamil ethnic group, a 
Hindu minority sharing the small island dominated by the majority Buddhist Sri 
Lankans.  The dream of the Tigers was Tamil Eelam, their own Hindi homeland.  This 
                                                 
127Faramarzi, Scheherazade.  “Girl Who Drove Car Bomb First Sent Mother Present.” The Associated 
Press, (International News, April 12, 1985).  
128 Pedazhur, 142.  
129 Faramarzi.  Subsequent quotes are from this article. 
130 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. Terrorists and Suicide Attacks. [Washington, D.C.]: Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, 2003.  5.  And Fair, C. Christine. Urban Battle Fields of South Asia Lessons 
Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004.  38. 
63 
ethnic and religious tension led to a guerilla war from 1993 to 2009, which killed over 
64,000.131  The persecution of Tamils contributed to the willingness of Tamils to 
become suicide bombers, even if they were conscripted by Tamil operatives.   
The LTTE carried out its first suicide bombing in 1989, six years after the MNF 
barracks bombing.  Over the next decade, the LTTE’s suicide bombing wing, the Black 
Tigers, became the most ruthless and most disciplined practitioners of suicide terrorism, 
responsible for more than half of the suicide attacks worldwide prior to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in 2003.132  The LTTE has been the only Tamil group to conduct suicide 
attacks, and between 1989 and 2009, the Black Tigers executed 109 suicide bombing 
missions, causing over 1,200 deaths.133  The Tigers used suicide bombings in 
conjunction with a conventional ground assault.  A suicide bomber would ram a truck 
loaded with explosives into a camp, followed by LTTE regulars penetrating the base 
with light arms.134  The LTTE were innovators, introducing the suicide bomb vest and 
the naval suicide bomb.  LTTE boat bombs destroyed a third of the Sri Lankan navy.135  
The LTTE’s target breakdown for its entire history is: Military (50%), Government 
(17%), Police (9%), and Civilian (17%).   
There are two issues regarding the Tamil campaign worth noting.  First, the 
Tamil suicide operatives were not self-selected.  Recruiters actively selected the Black 
Tigers, and the chosen could not withdraw from planned operations without fear of 
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retaliation against their families.  This contrasts with the martyrs in the Middle East, 
which are mostly self-recruiting and deeply committed to global ideology.136  
Secondly, the LTTE have often been characterized as a secular organization, 
which is a misconception.  The LTTE mixed Marxist rhetoric with Hindu sacred values.  
Like many of the organizations that emerged in the mid-1970s, the Tamil Tigers started 
as a revolutionary nationalist movement that paid loose obeisance to Marxist and 
international Leftist rhetoric.  Prabhakaran established a Stalinist platform centered on 
his personality.  In the 1998 document “Struggle for Tamil Eelam and the Liberation 
Tigers,” the LTTE declared:137 
LTTE has resolved to work in solidarity with the world national liberation 
movements, socialist states, and international working class parties.  We uphold 
an anti-imperialist policy and therefore we pledge our militant solidarity against 
western imperialism, neo-colonialists, Zionism, racism and other forces of 
reaction. 
 
All LTTE members swear an oath to sacrifice their life for their land: ‘‘I hereby 
promise that I am prepared to sacrifice my life and fight to create a free Socialist Tamil 
Eelam, which is the sublime aspiration of our Revolutionary Organization.’’138  
Despite the coercive recruitment, the LTTE nurtured a cult of martyrdom for its 
Black Tigers.  The LTTE built holy shrines for martyrs and created five holidays 
honoring them.139  The Black Tigers anticipated respect in this life and some form of 
immortality.140  The LTTE constructed a statue of Captain Millar, the first LTTE 
suicide bomber.  Tamils sold filmed suicide attacks, and billboards in Tamil areas 
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displayed a cartoon showing women how to detonate in a way to kill as many as 
possible.141  Tamil children could recite the names of martyrs.142  
The Tamil Tigers relied on the Hindu concept of tiyakam from the Bhagavad-
Gita.  Tiyakam is the “voluntary abandonment of life,” the taking of one’s life as well as 
someone else’s.143  This is a specific type of sacred death, which LTTE extrapolated as 
a sacred form of murder-suicide.  Likewise, Prabhakaran relied on Hindu constructs of 
“guru-ship” to justify his cult of personality and command obedience.  He promoted 
himself as a descendant of the Chola Kings, which embodied the spirit of Tamil’s 
glorious past.144   
The LTTE collapsed so quickly after his death in 2009 because his personal 
brand was so vital to the LTTE culture.  He formed a quasi-religion with him at the 
center of the Tamil universe, and every suicide attack went through him.  LTTE 
operatives, other than leaders, did not meet Prabhakaran until selected as Black Tigers.  
Prior to each attack, the Tiger would get to enjoy dinner with Prabhakaran, for some an 
almost religious experience.  “For us, he is mother, father, and God all rolled into one,” 
one Tiger said of Prabhakharan.  Another dying Tigress, who rammed a bulldozer into 
Sri Lankan lines and with limbs blown away, spat out water given to her by Sri Lankan 
soldiers, and died with “Annai, Annai (Elder Brother, referring to Prabhakaran)” on her 
lips.  
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Chapter 4: The Operationalization of Martyrdom and Qutbism: 
Hamas, Al Qaeda, and ISIS 
The Palestinian Campaigns 
The Development of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
The Palestinian campaigns represented the confluence of nationalism and 
religion.  Both Hamas and PIJ sprouted from the Palestinian wing of the Muslim 
brotherhood, the post-WWI leader in promoting Islamist political thought.145  The First 
Intifada represented the long standing, grassroots resentment toward both Israel and the 
PLO, and thus gave groups such as the PIJ and Hamas, untainted by compromise, and 
energetically infused with religious confidence, the platform to confront Israel with 
extreme measures.  Hamas and PIJ benefitted significantly from being “off brand” at the 
time of Palestinian frustration with the PLO, due to the PLO’s concessions to Israel 
during the peace process.  The PLO also disenfranchised many Palestinians due to a 
corrupt patronage system that provided differential access to the scarce economic 
resources and opportunities available to Palestinians—with preference given to PLO 
supporters for those jobs, scholarships, and similar economic assets.146   
In the midst of the First Intifada (1987-1991), Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin 
declared Islam and Palestine as one.  Ceding an inch of land was not permissible, which 
appealed to many Palestinians angry over PLO concessions.147  In doing so, Hamas 
matched Palestinian grievances with Islamist politics and objectives.  As much as 90% 
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of Hamas’s work was in social, welfare, cultural, and educational activities, which 
created a clientele base to build its organizational brand.148   
In the late 80s, Qutbist influenced groups in Palestine started to consider 
martyrdom operations.  In 1988, the founder of the Islamic Jihad, Dr. Fathi Shaqiqi, 
argued for the Palestinian cooption of Hezbollah’s martyrdom operations.  An 
ideological potpourri of Sayyid Qutb, Karl Marx, and the Ayatollah Khomeini heavily 
influenced Shaqiqi.149 According to Shaqiqi, the suicide bombing (which he called a 
“Gift from God”) fulfilled numerous Qur’anic requirements for striving in the cause of 
God—particularly, the commandment not to waver in the face of the enemy.150   
Despite Hamas’ Sunni orientation, Hamas turned to and received logistical 
support and military training from Iran.151  Ideology influenced perceptions, strategy, 
and tactics, but ideological divide did not mean a divide in operational assistance or 
cooperation.  Iran also provided much of the PIJ’s operating budget, and the PIJ and 
Hezbollah conducted joint attacks in south Lebanon.152 In the early 1990s, Israeli Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin expelled 415 Hamas militants from the West Bank to Lebanon.  
Hezbollah accommodated Hamas in 1992 and trained the Sunnis in suicide terrorism.153  
Even though Hezbollah never paraded martyrs in Lebanon, Hezbollah impressed upon 
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the Palestinians the need to videotape martyrs and to exploit the media value of the 
martyr.154   
Hamas and the PIJ conducted suicide attacks to derail the Oslo Peace Accords 
between Israel and the PLO.155  The first suicide bombing in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict took place in the West Bank in April 1993, at an Israeli restaurant.  In the 
1990s, Hamas performed 24 suicide bombings, followed by 51 suicide attacks during 
the Second Intifada in the early 2000s.156  Among all organizations during the Second 
Intifada, there were 147 suicide attacks in Israel and the occupied territories, with 
reports of 450 planned attacks.157  For all years, the breakdown of targets in Israel and 
the Occupied Territories include: Military (21%), Government (1%), Police (3%), 
Civilian (69%), and the remaining unknown (5%). 
Palestinian Use of Suicide Terrorism 
Hamas and the PIJ represent the straddling over national political objectives and 
religious influence.  In the context of this conflict, the trauma of the Palestinian 
experience constructed narratives about target acceptability and the religious rewards 
for martyrdom that groups removed from Palestine would adopt.  Through the 
martyrdom narrative, the Palestinian groups incentivized suicide terrorism through the 
emphasis of individual rewards for suicide.   
To the Palestinians, all targets were military.  Since all Israeli civilians were 
soldiers, Israeli civilians were military targets.  However, future bombers in Saudi 
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Arabia, Chechnya, and Libya would make the same one-to-one comparison between 
military and civilian targets.  The Saudi bomber who would enter Iraq to detonate at a 
Shia market had observed the Palestinian bomber enter a Sbarro and kill Israeli 
civilians.  The artifice of the attack was carried over from one conflict to the next 
without context for why civilians were justified (or perceived as such) in the former.   
This is why it is vital to discuss intergroup hostility and the consequences of the 
narrative of the in-group and out-group parameters. For Hezbollah and the Lebanese 
bombers, the enemies were the foreign military and political forces with boots on the 
ground—the United States, France, and Israel.  There is no reason to think Hezbollah 
viewed the American, French, or even the Israeli people as the enemy worthy of suicide 
targets.  The out-group was small.  For the Tamils, the out-group expanded to include 
Sri Lankans as a whole, and the LTTE conducted some attacks against Sri Lankan 
civilians—however the homeland of Tamil Eelam was not to exist at the expense of a 
Sri Lankan homeland.   
For Hamas and the Palestinian groups, particularly the Islamist groups that 
described Islam and Palestine as one and opposed the peace process, all Israelis were 
enemies—military and civilian.  The out-group was large, at least for the region.  For 
the Chechens, all Russians were the enemy.158  For Al Qaeda, all Americans (and its 
allies) were the enemy.  For ISIS, all who stand in the way of an Islamic State are the 
enemy—which includes Americans, Iraqis, Syrians, French, Belgians, and even Al 
Qaeda.  The Palestinian groups started to conflate military and civilian targets, and in 
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doing so, created the framework that Al Qaeda and ISIS would use to justify civilian 
targets. 
Similar to Sheikh Fadlallah with Hezbollah, the justification of targets for the 
Palestinian Islamist groups was the result from the messenger, not necessarily the 
ideological justification in and of itself.  Hamas and the PIJ defended the transition of 
targets from hard military targets to soft civilian targets in three ways: 
• In a democracy, the electorate is responsible for the decisions made by those in 
power, and the electorate pays the taxes that support military actions. 
• Mohammed used catapults to hurl rocks over the walls of cities, and these rocks 
likely killed unarmed civilians. 
• In the case of Muslims killed in the midst of suicide attacks, those Muslims that 
live among infidels or work in their interest are apostates worthy of death.159 
 
In March 2002, Hamas conducted a suicide bombing outside the Park Hotel at Netanya, 
killing over 30 Israeli civilians, one of the deadliest attacks in the Second Intifada.160  
Although the Palestinian Authority (PA) condemned the attack, one year later, the PA 
sponsored a soccer tournament using the name of the martyr who conducted the attack, 
attempting to capitalize on martyrdom operations for its own value.   
When the Palestinian groups conducted attacks in the mid-1990s, they did so to 
practice a coherent strategy of harming the Israel-PLO peace process.  Hamas and the 
PIJ practiced exogenous control over suicide terrorism, managing it in strict control 
over each attack.  However, Israeli assassinations of top Palestinian leaders gutted this 
strategy among Hamas’ cells in the Second Intifada.  This led to “organized anarchy,” a 
bottom up approach to targets based on availability.161  With an increase in popular 
support for suicide bombings among Palestinians, the Second Intifada demonstrated an 
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endogamous control over the tactic, as the culture and the individuals willing to become 
bombers pushed Hamas, the PIJ, and even secular-leaning organizations to conduct 
suicide attacks to attract popular support.  The symbolic attack became a value in and of 
itself, with organizations seeking to become associated with martyrdom.  The bottom-
up strategy reinforced the willingness to attack civilians.  As a Hamas training manual 
notes, “it is foolish to hunt the tiger when there are plenty of sheep around.”162  
Popular support for suicide bombings, both as a concept and for the 
organizations practicing suicide terrorism, increased between intifadas.  The Hamas 
organizers reiterated that if the Palestinian people opposed suicide attacks, Hamas 
would not pursue them.163  In the first intifada, support for suicide operations did not 
surpass a third of Palestinians.  By November 2000, support for operations was up to 
two-thirds of Palestinians polled, and popular support for Hamas rose to over 70%.164   
The increased popular support for suicide attacks influenced increased 
organizational use of the tactic.  In Dying to Kill, researcher Mia Bloom investigated the 
level of popular support Palestinian groups in Gaza and the West Bank for suicide 
attacks.  She tracked bumps in approval ratings for the different Palestinian groups after 
conducting—or taking credit for—suicide attacks against Israel targets.165  Fatah 
created the suicide bombing wing Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) as a response to 
the popularity of Hamas’ martyrdom attacks.  The AAMB’s first attack occurred in 
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January 17, 2002.  By mid-2002, the Fatah wing was conducting most of the suicide 
bombings.166   
In the First Intifada, Hamas and the PIJ synchronized attacks to respond to 
progress in the peace talks between Israel and the PLO, but groups rarely claimed 
public acceptance of responsibility.  In the Second Intifada, groups would mutually 
claim the same attack, demonstrating the change in support for suicide bombings.167  
Hamas and PIJ issued competing claims for the August 2001 Sbarro bombing, and 
Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) issued competing 
claims for the May 2002 market attack.  As many as four different groups would take 
credit for any given attack.  The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the 
PFLP, and the AAMB all co-opted the religious language of jihad from Hamas and the 
PIJ.  The PFLP resurrected some measure of popularity after adopting suicide terrorism, 
leading to higher support in 2001 than in 2000 after conducting a handful of attacks.  
Groups would publish posters of martyrs, marketing the same martyr as their own.   
In the Second Intifada, Palestinian networks operated in horizontal networks that 
responded to popular support rather than hierarchical structures receiving top-down 
orders.168  There was closeness and cohesion in the networks, and leaders of cells did 
not hold senior positions.  The Palestinian networks competed against each other, as 
cells would respond to other organizations’ and even other cells’ attacks.  A horizontal 
network implies target selection based on opportunity and prejudice toward the out-
group, with little attention paid to long term strategic benefits.  The bottom up-approach 
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is one factor that explains the sizable increase in civilian targets.  The tactic is pushed 
up, instead of managed, as in the LTTE and, to a certain extent, Lebanese campaigns.  
In August 2003, Hamas condemned a suicide attack that disrupted the peace process.  
The al-Qassam Brigades, the martyrdom operation wing of Hamas, nonetheless released 
the martyrdom video of the bomber and took credit for the attack.169  Hamas may have 
been disingenuous in denying the attack, or it could be that Hamas did not have 
structural control over the martyrdom operations.   
Cognitive Terrain of Palestinian Bombers 
The background of Palestinian bombers suggests that these martyrs were not 
uneducated or poor.170  In fact, most had comparatively high levels of education and 
income relative to the overall Palestinian population.171  Although these factors may not 
mean that the Palestinian bombers were content with themselves and the world, it is 
difficult to build an argument that personal deprivation motivates Palestinian bombers 
en masse.172  
Hamas only recruited bombers who understood the religious context of the 
martyrdom operation; many recruits had large sections of the Qur’an memorized.173 
Recruits had to read six specific chapters of the Qur’an: Baqara, Al Imran, Anfal, 
Tawba, Rahman, and Asr, which focus on jihad, the rewards of martyrdom, and the 
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need for faith.174  The future bomber would fast for extended periods, spend hours 
praying each evening, and ask for forgiveness of all sins.175  Whereas Sheikh Ahmed 
Yassin never praised the personal rewards of martyrdom, Yassin justified suicide 
attacks with Surah 2:190-1: “Fight in the way of Allah against those who fight against 
you…slay them wherever you find them and drive them out of the place when they 
drove you out, for persecution is worse than slaughter.”176  
Hamas’ training involved instilling the religious importance to remove fear, 
visiting the cemetery, and videotaping the will, which made it difficult for recruits to 
back out.177  The typical video testament involved the martyr reciting the Qur’an, 
posing with weapons, praising jihad, and asking others to follow.  The bomber watched 
his video repeatedly in order to help confront the fear of death and internalize it or, as 
one trainer described, “greet death like an old friend.”178  
Nasra Hassan interviewed over 250 Palestinian suicide bombing trainers and 
failed suicide bombers to understand the mindset of these attackers.  Many quotes from 
Hamas operatives are reprinted below, because their words represent what other Sunni 
martyrs in following campaigns will say and what inspires them, and the quotes state 
their beliefs better than a summation would.  The Hamas preparation for the bomber 
emphasized the internationalization of Heaven: 
We focus his attention on Paradise, on being in the presence of Allah, on 
meeting the Prophet Muhammad, on interceding for his loved ones so that they, 
too, can be saved from the agonies of Hell, on the houris (the black-eyed virgins 
                                                 
174 Hafez, Mohammed M. Manufacturing Human Bombs. 24. 
175 Hassan, Nasra.  “An Arsenal of Believers” The New Yorker.  November 19th, 2001. 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/11/19/an-arsenal-of-believers (Accessed 16 November 2015). 
176 Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York, N.Y.: Columbia University press, 2006. 
161. 
177 Forest, James J. F. The Making of a Terrorist Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes. Westport, 
Conn: Praeger Security International, 2006. 157. 
178 Hassan, Nasra.   
75 
awarded to the martyr upon entering Heaven), and on fighting the Israeli 
occupation and removing it from the Islamic trust that is Palestine…It is very, 
very near—right in front of our eyes.  It lies beneath the thumb.  On the other 
side of the detonator.179 
 
Hamas’s leadership downplayed the specifics of the martyrs’ heavenly rewards, as the 
discourse on the houris would become overtly sexual.  Organizationally, however, its 
operatives treated the martyrdom videos less as a funeral and more a wedding 
celebration of the martyr to many beautiful women upon death.180  In addition to the 
houris, the benefits of martyrdom included forgiveness of sins, the right to intervene on 
behalf of seventy relatives for entrance into Heaven, protection against the pain of 
death, and even the chance to play golf with Mohammed.181  Hassan describes her 
interview with a Hamas imam, who explained that the martyr’s first drop of blood 
washes away his sins instantly:  
On the Day of Judgment, he will face no reckoning.  On the Day of 
Resurrection, he can intercede for seventy of his nearest and dearest to enter 
Heaven; and he will have at his disposal seventy-two houris, the beautiful 
virgins of Paradise.  The Imam took pains to explain that the promised bliss is 
not sensual. 
 
One of failed bombers described the sacred aspect of the plan: 
Our planner asked, ‘What if the operation fails?’ We told him, ‘In any case, we 
get to meet the Prophet and his companions, Inshallah.’ We were floating, 
swimming, in the feeling that we were about to enter eternity.  We had no 
doubts.  We made an oath on the Qur’an, in the presence of Allah—a pledge not 
to waver.  This jihad pledge is called bayt al ridwan, after the garden in Paradise 
that is reserved for the prophets and the martyrs…All martyrdom operations, if 
done for Allah’s sake, hurt less than a gnat’s bite! 
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Hassan’s interviewees did not express the profile of suicidal persons.  They were 
educated, middle class or above, two were sons of millionaires, and all deeply religious.  
Hassan’s summation describes this fusion between nationalism and religion:  
I was told that in order to be accepted for a suicide mission the volunteers had to 
be convinced of the religious legitimacy of the acts they were contemplating, as 
sanctioned by the divinely revealed religion of Islam.  Many of these young men 
had memorized large sections of the Qur’an and were well versed in the finer 
points of Islamic law and practice.  But their knowledge of Christianity was 
rooted in the medieval Crusades, and they regarded Judaism and Zionism as 
synonymous.  When they spoke, they all tended to use the same phrases: "The 
West is afraid of Islam." "Allah has promised us ultimate success." "It is in the 
Qur’an." "Islamic Palestine will be liberated." And they all exhibited an 
unequivocal rage toward Israel.  Over and over, I heard them say, "The Israelis 
humiliate us.  They occupy our land, and deny our history."  
 
The Palestinian groups mastered the “cult of martyrdom” and the ritual 
celebration of martyrs.182  The West Bank and Gaza would have “Martyrs of the 
Month,” celebrating bombers like centerfolds or sports heroes.183  In Jenin, the walls of 
hospital waiting rooms were covered with posters and pictures celebrating the 
Palestinian “martyrs.”  In Palestinian camps, teenagers traded “martyr” cards like 
baseball cards.  Martyrs were heroes and thus role models.  With the Internet, the cult of 
martyrdom and the individual rewards associated with murder-suicide would spread 
from Palestine, into Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Libya.  Operation Iraqi Freedom would 
give these self-selected mesmerized by the narrative the chance to emulate martyrdom. 
The Role of the Chechen Conflict in Driving Suicide Terrorism 
There are two interrelated trends in the Chechen conflict that help explain the 
transition to the Era of Fitna.  The first is the cooption of a nationalist rebellion with 
strong transnational Islamist overtones, which included the importing of tactics 
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dissonant with the local folk Islam.  The second is the influence of online media 
dissemination of mujahideen battling the infidel, which would change the face of the 
mujahid from the cloister of Middle East conflict, expanding the possibility of 
martyrdom-infused jihad with Muslims from any region. 
Sufi Chechens initiated the first Chechen War for Independence.  Traditionally, 
moderation and modernization characterized Chechen Sufism, and Chechnya was more 
democratic and socially liberal compared to other Islamic regions at the time.184 
President Dzhokhar Dudayev, despite declaring jihad against Russia in 1992, explicitly 
declared the Chechen Republic to be an institutionally secular state, and in fact warned 
against Islamic Fundamentalism taking hold of Chechnya.185  Only five percent of the 
Chechens subscribed to the militant Islamist ideology imported by the foreign 
fighters.186  During the first Chechen War, despite the examples of Hezbollah and the 
LTTE, the Sufi Chechens never used suicide bombings against Russia’s incursion. 
Between the first Chechen War and the second, Chechnya received a steady 
flow of jihadist fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, and the Middle East, who 
co-opted the nationalist cause for their own objective of building emirates to support the 
neo-Caliphate.  In 1990s, the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, then funded by the 
Russians, blocked the advance of the Taliban.  To weaken the coalition of warlords 
from the North, al-Qaeda decided to force the Russians to waste blood and treasure in 
Chechnya.187  In 1994, Islamist elements in Afghanistan and Pakistan began nurturing 
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and training Shamil Basayev, a Chechen born fighter.  Basayev and the Saudi Ibn al-
Khattab established al-Qaeda training camps in Chechnya, creating enough trainees to 
mount an invasion of neighboring Russian republic of Dagestan that led to the Second 
Chechen War in 1999.188  Within a year, Vladimir Putin’s Moscow had reestablished 
control over most of the region.  Besayev’s group started its suicide bombing campaign 
in 2000, mostly to strike fear among Russians rather than to achieve clear military 
victory.189  Between 2000 and 2003, 48% of Chechen suicide attacks targeted the 
Russian military, and only 12% targeted civilians.  However, no Chechen suicide attack 
has occurred against a Russian military target since 2003, and overall, the Chechen 
groups and its nearby Dagestan allies are responsible for the following Russian target 
breakdown: Military (16%), Government (18%), Police (34%), and Civilian (28%). 
Chechen guerilla leaders utilized various media platforms to disseminate the 
Chechen cause, and in doing so, changed the face of jihad.  Khattab released dozens of 
tapes in a series called “Russian Hell,” which framed the Chechen fight as part of global 
jihad.  The tapes depicted ambushes and assaults on Russian forces, and became a 
recruiting tool distributed throughout a network of mosques as far as Indonesia.190  Such 
propaganda, some of which is easily accessible online, marketed jihad to Muslims 
removed from the Arab in-group, essentially putting a Caucasian face (even though 
Khattab was Saudi) to global jihad.  The consequence was that any Muslim of any 
background could enjoy martyrdom and bring about a new Islamic state.   
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Al Qaeda 
Al Qaeda Development of Suicide Terrorism 
Globalization caters to Qutbism.  Any ideology that transcends boundaries and 
creates a global in-group against any local out-group can flourish.  The flat world makes 
the spread of ideas and imagery instant.  Muslims cognitively identify with fellow 
Muslims suffering at the hands of oppressed infidels thousands of miles away, which is 
emotionally traumatizing.191   
With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Bin Laden found the opportunity to 
use the incursion as a means to unify Muslims to combat the Jahiliyya regimes in the 
Arab world.  Bin Laden and other Arab leaders joined the fight late against the Soviets 
in Afghanistan.  On April 17, 1987, Bin Laden led his first attack on an Afghan 
Government post; the Arab mujahideen lacked preparation and retreated in humiliation 
by one machine gunner.192  Nonetheless, this new in-group acted like they were decisive 
conquerors, riding the back of the Afghan mujahideen who truly engaged the Soviets.  
In 1988, Bin Laden formed Al Qaeda al-Jihad, “The Base of the Jihad.” Al Qaeda 
bridged disparate local jihadist groups—such as Ayman Zawahiri’s Egyptian militant 
group—into one globalized effort to strike at the sponsors of regional tyrants in the 
Arab World.  The US would be the prime target, so that the US would stop supporting 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, and the international system in the Middle East.   
The Palestinian Abdullah Azzam was one of Bin Laden’s professors and early 
co-leaders.  Azzam, who recruited many Arab mujahideen to Afghanistan to fight the 
Soviets, argued that the mujahideen must fall in love with death and become infatuated 
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with martyrdom.193  Azzam’s book Lovers of the Paradise Maidens tell stories of 
mujahideen killed while fighting for God and Virtues of Martyrdom in the Path of Allah 
describes the rewards of the martyr, including the infamous seventy-two member houris 
and the power to intercede for seventy members of the martyr’s family.194  These 
descriptions incentivized martyrdom, and they become a common strain in any conflict 
involving radicalized Sunnis.  Azzam prioritized liberating Jerusalem and opposed 
discussion of takfir, which is calling fellow Sunnis unbelievers because they do not 
adhere to Salafist theological assumptions.195  Zawahiri on the other hand endorsed 
takfir and prioritized revolution in American-sponsored Arab countries, which required 
confronting the US.196  Azzam was killed in Pakistan in 1989, possibly with Bin 
Laden’s knowledge.  The death of Azzam assured that Bin Laden’s main influencer 
would be Zawahiri, who was the Al Qaeda advocate of martyrdom operations. 
 The Sunni background of Al Qaeda meant little to Bin Laden when it came to 
learning from successful Shia militants.  Bin Laden considered Hezbollah experts and 
sent his people to learn from them—particularly about the bombing of the US barracks.  
Bin Laden’s operatives went to Beirut, took careful notes, and returned with the 
operational concepts and knowledge necessary for the 1998 embassy bombings.197 
During the guilty plea of Ali Muhammad for the US Embassy bombings, Muhammad 
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confessed to setting up meetings in the early 1990s between Bin Laden and Imad 
Mugniyeh, the operational planner behind the Beirut barracks bombing.198  
In 1998, UBL issued the fatwa that declared that all Muslims have the duty to 
kill Americans, to liberate Jerusalem, and to remove foreign forces from Holy Land.199  
In an ABC interview that year, Bin Laden argued, “We do not differentiate between 
those dressed in military uniforms and civilians.  They are all targets.”200  To justify 
civilian targets, Bin Laden quoted Surah 9:5: “[F]ight and slay the pagans wherever ye 
find them, seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them.”201 
Although Al Qaeda never had any working relationship with the Palestinian 
groups, it extracted the justification and cosmic martyrdom associated with Palestinian 
suicide attacks out of the Middle East.  The martyrdom operation became the symbol to 
advance the goals of the Qutbist movement, and any Western symbol—or Westerner—
became a legitimate target.  In doing so, Al Qaeda expanded permissible targets in 
war.202  With the help of globalization, Al Qaeda incentivized self-starting franchises 
and cells to attack these targets, insisting that the Salafi generation’s Islamic conquest of 
Jahiliyya should never have stopped.  No other group has invested the time, effort, and 
money to exploit suicide terrorism as Al Qaeda.203  
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Bin Laden transformed regional conflicts between Arabs and Muslims living 
under ugly regimes in the Middle East into global conflicts with the US and its allies.204 
The strategic objective of the September 11th attacks was to provoke a disproportionate 
US military response that would have the second order effect of waking up the 
“slumbering nation of Islam,” rallying it to confront the West.205  Al Qaeda planned to 
erode US military power by spreading its military and intelligence forces while making 
the US hemorrhage money.  As summarized by Bin Laden, “each of Al-Qaida’s dollars 
defeated one million American dollars, thanks to Allah’s grace.”206  As Al-Zawahiri 
argues, jihadists must be patient—this is a generational game—as empires do not fall in 
a moment but in decades.207  
Cognitive Terrain of Al Qaeda Bombers 
In 1997, Islamic philosopher Abu Ruqaiyah published “The Islamic Legitimacy 
in Martyrdom Operations.” He defines martyrdom operations as attacks “performed by 
one or more people, against enemies far outstripping them in numbers and equipment, 
with prior knowledge that the operations will almost inevitably lead to death.”208  
Ruqaiyah cites controversial Surahs of the Qur’an at face value (such as Surah 9:5), and 
concludes, “Evidences from the Qur’an and the Sunna (Muslim law)….clearly 
demonstrated the ‘Islamic bombing assault’ or the ‘martyrdom attack’ is Islamically 
legitimate as far as it is within the framework of Islam.”  In fact, suicide bomber 
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martyrs are superior to martyrs killed by other means.  The extent of Ruqaiyah’s 
influence is unknown; however, Al Qaeda and ISIS have echoed his arguments to 
justify martyrdom operations against civilian targets.   
Jihadist manuals confiscated in Iraq and Afghanistan and disseminated online 
translate Islamic military history into modern operational systems.  For example, the 
Muaskar al-Battar manual itself refers to al-Battar, a sword carried by the Prophet 
Muhammad.  The manual provides lessons learned from the fights in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, practical guerilla warfare advice, and spiritual guidance.  It also cites 
Sayyid Qutb, reiterates Qur’an verses on the battles of Mohammad, describes how to 
take apart and reassemble a machine gun, recommends a CrossFit daily workout for 
physical fitness, and presents poems praising the heavenly reward of the martyr.209  The 
180-page Al Qaeda manual, Military Studies in the Jihad against Tyrants, reiterates 
war-centric Surahs from the Qur’an and makes reference to battles led by Muhammad, 
presenting them as scripts for how the mujahideen should fight.210  Qutbists routinely 
cite the same Surahs in these manuals to justify martyrdom operations, namely the 
command to strike terror in the enemy and to not turn from the enemy.211  
In order to attract supporters, Qutbists must create and sustain intense individual 
motivation for sacrifice.212  To this end, Al Qaeda must frame the enemy a moral 
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monster to justify the most powerful sacrifice one can make.  In Bin Laden’s November 
22, 2002 “Letter to America,” Bin Laden presents a laundry list of evils the US has 
committed, covering every possible political angle one can conceive.  This includes the 
occupation of Palestine, American intrusions in Somalia, tacit support for Russia 
against Chechnya and India against Kashmir, the denial of Sharia law, the theft of oil 
wealth, the bases in Saudi Arabia, the sanctions against Iraq that led to starvation, the 
denial of God in politics, the usage of usury (even though forbidden by all religions), 
the propagation of alcohol, President Bill Clinton’s sexual indiscretions, polluting the 
earth, refusal to sign the Kyoto Accords, and finally, dropping nuclear bombs on 
Japan.213  Bin Laden places essentially every possible negative characteristic at the 
United States’ feet, and offers Islam as the solution.  To prospective recruits, 
positioning the enemy in such terms guarantees that one’s death will be noble and 
rewarded by a just God standing in judgment of such a cosmic criminal.  The alternative 
is Islam, which Bin Laden’s describes in the same letter: 
It is the religion of the tawhid of Allah, sincerity, the best of manners, 
righteousness, mercy, honor, purity, and piety.  It is the religion of showing 
kindness to others, establishing justice between them, granting them their rights, 
and defending the oppressed and the persecuted…It is the religion of jihad in the 
way of Allah, so that Allah’s Word and religion reign supreme.  And it is the 
religion of tawhid and agreement in obedience to Allah, and total equality 
between all people, without regard to their color, sex, or language… 
 
To Al-Zawahiri, the best tactic to fight for justice was martyrdom operations:214  
The need to concentrate on the method of martyrdom operations as the most 
successful way of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least costly to 
the Mujahideen in terms of casualties. 
 
Al Qaeda’s franchise in Iraq will make the most of this logic and rationale. 
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ISIS 
ISIS Use of Suicide Terrorism, Trends in Targets 
ISIS exploited suicide terrorism to its most atrocious conclusions.  Unlike the 
previous campaigns, ISIS enthusiastically attacked civilians, which represented a 
plurality of targets in most years.  Although ISIS was not the only organization 
conducting attacks, by 2006, the Department of Defense believed ISIS was responsible 
for 90% of the suicide attacks in Iraq.215  The majority of suicide attacks began taking 
place more than a year and a half after the fall of the regime.216  Table 4 presents the 
trend in targets in Iraq, particularly from 2005 through 2012, when civilians composed 
almost half of all attacks.  In 2013, ISIS suicide attacks resurged with open 
confrontation against Iraqi military and police forces.   
Table 4 - Iraq Suicide Attacks, by Target (START) 
Iraq Total Military Government Police Civilian Informal 
OIF (2003-2004) 86 22% 26% 29% 22% 1% 
Fitna (2005-2012) 775 12% 12% 27% 44% 4% 
ISIS Resurgence (2013-2014) 579 32% 8% 30% 23% 5% 
For All Years 1440 21% 12% 28% 34% 4% 
 
ISIS violated even some of its own broad Islamic in-group norms, using 
martyrdom operations against Shias and Sunni collaborators.  In Suicide Bombers in 
Iraq (2007), Mohammad Hafez documents that in the first few months of OIF, 100% of 
suicide attacks targeted the American-led coalition forces.  But by 2006, less than 10% 
targeted coalition forces, 50% targeted Iraqi security forces, and almost 40% targeted 
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primarily Shia civilian targets.217  These suicide attacks would kill more civilians than 
coalition soldiers by a great margin, and children were more likely to die than adults.218  
ISIS conducted suicide attacks against everyone except the foreign occupiers, and relied 
on non-suicide attacks—IEDs, sniper attacks—against coalition forces.219  
Bin Laden insisted on a conciliatory approach to handling Shia and Sunni 
conflict, yet ISIS made Shias the prime target in suicide operations.  Ideology 
influenced ISIS’ end-state objectives (a pure Islamic state) and the hatred of Shias and 
non-Salafist Sunnis, but there were pragmatic political reasons for inciting civil war.  
Abu Musab Zarqawi’s intended to force a civil war between Sunnis and Shias, with 
suicide terrorism a valuable tactic to enflame Shia hatred.220  If Al Qaeda can attack the 
US in order to force the US to invade countries in the Middle East, which would induce 
Muslims to side with Al Qaeda, then Al Qaeda in Iraq can attack Shias in order to force 
Shia reprisals against Sunnis, which would unite Sunnis on the side of Al Qaeda in Iraq.   
Hafez described this as a system disruption strategy, using martyrdom 
operations against Iraqi civilians to destabilize the government and spark sectarian 
warfare.221  Suicide attacks would cast the Iraqi government as incompetent, incapable 
or unwilling to provide security.222  Denying the new government the chance to 
stabilize itself created the terrain for Al Qaeda in Iraq to establish the Islamic State.  
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Either the US would stay in Iraq and continue to bleed, or Iran would play a stronger 
hand in Iraq to protect Shias, either of which would further alienate Sunnis.  This 
civilian targeting outlived Zarqawi’s death in 2006 and continued until open 
confrontation with Iraqi forces began in 2013.223  Sunnis that aid the new Iraqi 
government were also targets, even competing Sunni insurgent groups.224  In 2007, 
when the Islamic Army (IA) refused to submit to the Islamic State, ISIS attacked the 
IA, killing 30 members.225  
Prominent civilian attacks include the February 22, 2006, suicide bombing of 
the Shia “Golden Mosque,” which destroyed the golden dome and touched off 
widespread Shia reprisals against Sunnis nationwide.226  In early 2006, a suicide 
bomber detonated himself at the Shia shrine of Imam Hussein, killing 63.227  Near the 
same time, a suicide bomber killed 56 police recruits in Ramadi.  In early 2007, a 
suicide bomber attacked a predominantly Shia market and killed over 100.228  In 
September 2007, a suicide bomber struck a Sunni tribal leader’s house near the Syrian 
border.229 
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Adjustments made by coalition forces to counter suicide attacks contributed to 
the reduction of suicide bombs against military personnel, but countermeasures do not 
explain why Islamic groups transitioned to soft targets instead of abandoning the tactic 
altogether.  For example, during this same time in Afghanistan, the Taliban primarily 
used suicide attacks against coalition forces and rarely civilians, despite the fact that 
they were fairly unsuccessful in causing any significant damage to coalition forces.230  
Suicide Bombers in Iraq provides three key observations, the final critical in 
understanding the role of the cognitive terrain in explaining suicide terrorism: the 
suicide bombers in Iraq target Iraqis and not the occupiers, the group pursuing this 
strategy is Salafist in ideology, and finally, that the suicide bombers themselves are not 
Iraqis.231  Only 10 percent of the suicide bombers in Iraq were native Iraqis.232  The 
majority of suicide bombers in Iraq were foreigners, many of them wealthy Saudis and 
Kuwaitis that were smuggled into Iraq via Syria.233  Most of the foreign bombers came 
from educated, middle class families, attracted to the recruiters’ intellectual and 
theological appeal.234  ISIS was not fighting the occupier—it was the occupier.   
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In Saudi Arabia and Syria, a network of Qutbist imams recruited volunteers, and 
forgers created new identities for the wannabe martyrs’ journey across Syrian-Iraqi 
border.235  In the summer of 2003, safe houses along the Syrian-Iraq border were 
established, as well as passages through dunes to smuggle fighters.236  One of the most 
prominent smuggling cells was at Sinjar, near the Iraq-Syria border.  American forces 
captured and closed this entry point in 2007, and in doing so, confiscated a series of 
documents that demonstrated the nature of these foreign fighters entering Iraq.  The 
Sinjar cell was responsible for up to 90% of all foreign fighters entering Iraq.237  These 
“Sinjar records” documented which countries the foreign fighters came from and for 
what reasons.  The records included surveys for the incoming fighters on their jihadist 
aspirations, and even questions on the quality of the smugglers.  
The records contained biographical sketches of over 700 foreign fighters that 
listed hometowns and other details of fighters smuggled into Iraq since August 2006.  In 
the records, 41% of fighters came from Saudi Arabia, 19% from Libya, 8% from Syria, 
8% from Yemen, 7% from Algeria, 6% from Morocco, and 2% from Jordan.238  The 
median age was 22-23, 43% were students, and universities were a critical recruiting 
ground.  On the requested role in the fighting the enemy, 56% wanted to be suicide 
bombers.  By nationality, 50% of Saudis came to be bombers, but 85% of Libyans, 92% 
of Moroccans, and 66% of Syrians signed up to be a bomber.  Many of these Saudi 
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bombers were married, well educated, and in their late 20s.239  In 2005, Reuven Paz 
conducted a study of the social origin of the Saudis killed in Iraq, and he concluded that 
the Saudis entering Iraq came from respected tribes and families, and had never 
participated in attacks prior to entering Iraq.240  After the closure of the Sinjar cell, the 
flow of foreign militants entering Iraq to fight for ISIS fell by half.241  
Cognitive Terrain of ISIS 
In December 2004, Usama Bin Laden identified conflict in Iraq as a “golden 
opportunity” for jihadists to engage and defeat the United States.242  Thus, Al Qaeda 
needed someone with the network and passion to take the fight to the coalition.  They 
turned to the Jordanian Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, who embraced a toxic mixture of 
militant Salafism—his mother enrolled him in the Salafist Al-Husayn Ben Ali Mosque 
in Amman—and brutal criminality, deal-making, and networking—learned after he 
spent time in a Jordanian prison.243  Despite Zarqawi’s brutality and fixation on the 
Sunni-Shia divide, his ‘rolodex of terrorism’ earned in prison provided a practical asset 
to Bin Laden’s operations against the US in Iraq.  The value of the contacts with 
smugglers and black market operatives are worth more than perfect philosophical union.  
Bin Laden and Zawahiri though Zarqawi was too extreme.  However, Al Qaeda gave 
Zarqawi their blessing as well as some assistance—200,000 US dollars, a small sum 
compared to their capability—to create a front against coalition forces.  
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Al Qaeda aimed to win the hearts and minds of Sunnis before laying the 
groundwork for an Islamic State.244  Zarqawi, however, cared little for Muslim popular 
opinion.  In 2005, ISIS published a “Why do we fight” document, which outlined the 
four reasons for Al Qaeda in Iraq: restore the Caliphate and Sharia, reject the rule of 
Shia, oppose democracy, and prepare for judgment day.245  Even after Zarqawi was 
killed in June 2006, Al Qaeda in Iraq declared an emirate without Al Qaeda’s consent in 
October 2006.246  Despite private misgivings, Al-Qaeda presented a united front in 
public and endorsed the establishment of the Islamic State in 2006.   
ISIS’ dragging of the Al Qaeda brand through the mud via intra-Muslim warfare 
frustrated Al-Qaeda’s inner circle.  Every ISIS excess stigmatized Al Qaeda, yet the 
latter could not denounce the group it endorsed.  Whereas Al Qaeda’s end goal was the 
same as ISIS—an Islamic State in the Middle East—Al Qaeda abhorred the promptness 
of ISIS’ intransigent franchise in Iraq.  Al Qaeda heard about al-Baghdadi’s 
appointment as emir of the Islamic State in 2010 through the media.  Zawahiri declined 
Baghdadi’s offer to make an explicit public pledge to Zawahiri after Bin Laden was 
killed, setting the stage for the divorce.   
ISIS under Zarqawi, his successor Abu Ayyub al-Masri, and the so-called 
Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi introduced two sacred values to reignite the product life 
cycle of “the cult of martyrdom” in the cognitive terrain of Qutbists.  These two values 
are the Caliphate and the End Times. One Australian ISIS supporter Anjem Choudary 
describes the importance of the Caliphate: “[Before the Caliphate], maybe 85 percent of 
the Sharia was absent from our lives…These laws are in abeyance until we have Khilafa 
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(Caliphate) and now we have one.”247  Theoretically, all Muslims must immigrate to 
new Caliphate, something which ISIS carefully markets.  In one of its advertisements, 
ISIS placed the phrase of the traditional witness of the faith, “No god but God.  
Muhammad is the messenger of God,” next to, “The Islamic State: A Caliphate in 
Accordance with the Prophetic Method.”248  Additional messaging includes, “Rush O 
Muslims to your state.  Yes, it is your state.  Rush, because Syria is not for the Syrians, 
and Iraq is not for the Iraqis.”249  
The belief in and celebration of the End Times reinforced the martyrdom 
narrative that incentivized suicide terrorism.  If the End is near, then planning for a 
future is irrelevant.  Judgment Day is near, so the believer will give an accounting 
before God soon. In 2012, thanks to all the regional chaos, half of all Muslims in the 
Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia believed the end was near and expected the 
Mahdi (the prophesied redeemer of Islam) to arrive.250  If there is a good reason to 
assume the End Times are near, it merely pushes martyrdom as a possible decision.   
ISIS is different from every other jihadist movement in that apocalypticism 
influences the decision making of the organization.  For highly devout Muslims, the 
apocalypse is a good thing to be welcomed, as it means God (through his Prophet Jesus) 
will eradicate all injustice on earth.251  Zarqawi would stir apocalyptic expectations, 
citing ISIS’s behavior as acting in line with prophetic fulfillment.252  According to the 
ISIS’ chief judge, Zarqawi’s replacement al-Masri announced the Islamic State in 2006 
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because he believed the Mahdi Muslim savior would come within the year.  For that to 
happen, the Caliphate had to be in place.  At the end of the Cold War period, 
apocalypticism was unpopular among modern Sunnis, associated with Shia obsession 
with the Mahdi.  Al Qaeda views ISIS’ apocalypticism with disdain.   
In this eschatology, Roman armies (roughly translated, depending on 
convenience, as the European Union, the US, or the UN) will invade the fields of Dabiq 
near Aleppo.  Dabiq will be where the Islamic armies turn the tide and defeat the 
invaders.253  Syria is mentioned in Islamic prophecies as site of final battles of the 
apocalypse, thus its continuing violence merely strengthens the belief that these 
prophecies are coming real.254  Turkey’s entrance into the Middle East increased 
commentary on the end times on social media, with comments from ISIS supporters 
such as, “Turkey’s entry into the war will permit the foreign invasion of northern Syria, 
meaning from the plain of Dabiq.  The battles [of the End Times] have grown near!” In 
2013, ISIS sacrificed significant forces these fields, despite these fields lacking any 
strategic value aside from symbolic value and the fulfillment of beliefs.  
ISIS relied on its Palestinian martyrdom narrative to soften the fear of suicide.  
The removal of Saddam Hussein provided the opportunity for Qutbist spectators of the 
Palestinian conflict to explore its possibilities.  ISIS campaign managers describe their 
foreign suicide bombers as overly impatient martyrs, pining for the rewards of jihad 
immediately.255  Sheik Adnan Khamese Jamiel, leader of the Albu Alwan tribe in 
Ramadi, described the recruitment pitch, “The bad imams tell the young people to go to 
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Iraq and fight the American Army, because if you kill them or they kill you, you will go 
to paradise.”256  Preachers in Saudi Arabia created videos, “Where are those striving to 
defend their religion? Where are the lovers of virgins in paradise? Where are the seekers 
of the Garden of Eden?”257  Zarqawi released videos of the “marriage ceremonies” of 
past martyrs, with the videos reiterating how each attacker is promised his own black 
eyed houris.258  Time magazine interviewed one of the bomb makers, who described the 
martyrs:  “In their last days, these men are usually thinking of God and 
paradise…Sometimes they like to hear about the rewards that are awaiting them.”259 
One bomb-maker named Ahmed, who had a degree in chemistry, recruited his 
own brother to be a bomber.  He described his brother before he set off on his attack: 
“He had a smile on his face…He knew he was crossing to a better place where he 
would meet his maker as a martyr.”260  One Saudi bomber was about to be married, yet 
he would talk of how “he wished to drink a sip from the sustenance of paradise while a 
virgin beauty wiped his mouth.”261  One Syrian, who was engaged to a college educated 
woman, refused to consummate the marriage.  He said of his wife, “She begged me to 
let her come along so that we could carry out a joint mission, she told me that would be 
the best honeymoon, in heaven together.”262  He had no Islamic inclinations prior to the 
Iraq war, but viewed every Iraqi woman as his mother or sister, and every boy his 
brother.  Redeeming lost honor in Abu Ghraib inspired some bombers as well.  One 
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Saudi bomber claimed that when he gets to heaven, he planned to marry a woman 
named Fatimah who US forces allegedly abused in Abu Ghraib.263   
In interviews with the media, Iraqi suicide bombers described the internalization 
of the Qutbist ideology.  In 2005, Bobby Ghosh of Time interviewed Marwan, an Iraqi 
martyrdom recruit.  Although brief, Marwan’s responses crossed off a checklist Qutbist 
factors, including the role of a strident in-group and out-group divide, group narcissism, 
and the heavenly rewards of suicide terrorism.  He expressed eagerness for the rewards 
of martyrdom.  “I can’t wait…I am ready to die now,” Marwan stated.264  He yearned 
for a global Islamic state, with “no alcohol, no music and no Western influence.” 
Marwan described the wisdom of his ISIS leaders and superiority of their perspective, 
“jihadists are more religious people…you ask them anything—anything—and they can 
instantly quote a relevant section from the Qur’an.” He said that the “Qur’an says it is a 
duty to bring terror to the enemy, so being a terrorist makes me a good Muslim.”  If he 
kills any innocent people in the attack, he believes God will ask them to forgive him.  
He describes how he thinks God will view him, “The only person who matters is 
Allah—and the only question he will ask me is ‘How many infidels did you kill?’”  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Shadows in the Cognitive Terrain:  Competition Over Sacred Values 
The shadows in the cognitive terrain are sacred values defined and positioned by 
sub-cultures and organizations in contrast to normative interpretation.  Conceptually, 
what separates a foundational sacred value from a simple definition is that groups 
compete over the value’s meaning.  A chair is easily defined and can be seen by an 
observer regardless of upbringing, background, or culture.  But, the true meaning of the 
American sacred value of “freedom” is debatable, and this debate incites competition 
over its meaning and which identity represents the true meaning of freedom. How that 
concept is truly defined by the individual American—there is a big difference in 
interpreting freedom from compared to freedom of—impacts his politics, his behavior, 
his expectations, his emotions, and his view of groups with competitive interpretations.   
The positioning of these sacred values strengthens current in-group identity or 
creates a new in-group identity based on their reinterpretation.  The internalization of 
the aberrant sacred values becomes vital needs to the individual seeking a new group 
identity.  The Qutbist identity is relatively new within Sunni Islam.  If the positioning of 
the sacred value creates a superior identity compared to subordinate groups, the 
reflective belief in this superiority triggers a group narcissistic posture that strengthens 
the will of the individual to depersonalize and dehumanize the out-group.   
For example, Christians used the book of Philemon to rationalize the 
perpetuation of slavery for many centuries.  In Philemon, Paul told the runaway slave 
Onesimus to return to his master.  Since Philemon is a part of the Bible, believed to be 
God’s infallible or inspired Word, believers inferred divine sanction for slavery based 
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on the sacred value of “God’s Word.”  Of course, the book of Philemon does not 
promote the normalization of slavery, and there were other Christians who used other 
sacred values in “God’s Word” to promote the abolition of slavery.  However, the use 
of Philemon to defend the existence of slavery is undeniable, and influenced the way 
believers for centuries viewed the relationship between Christianity and slavery.  There 
are Christians who use statements against miscegenation in Leviticus to oppose 
intermarriage between whites and blacks.  This is a gross misuse of the type of inter-
marriage Leviticus protests.   
Likewise, Qutbists position martyrdom, jihad, and the pure Islamic state to 
inspire and justify suicide bombings.  These interpretations contort normative 
interpretation of those values.  There is much more in Islam that would condemn 
murder-suicide than promote the behavior.  However, it is ignorant to pretend that this 
competition does not exist and ignore the basis for the Qutbists’ conclusions.  
Competition over the values of jihad, tawhid, and martyrdom merely induces some to 
take extreme definitions in order to justify a distinct in-group as superior to others.  
Group narcissism can still be found in the shadows of sacred values, and through death, 
the martyr connects to the highest form of self in Heaven.  Suicide terrorism is one of 
the most pernicious executions of this group narcissism, because of the extreme 
exchange involved to purchase the highest and best identity.   
Vital Needs and the Cognitive Terrain: The Case of Jake Bilardi 
On March 11th 2015 at a checkpoint in Ramadi, eighteen year old Australian 
Jake Bilardi detonated a suicide bomb that killed seventeen Iraqis.  Bilardi documented 
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his radicalization in a series of blogposts leading up to his martyrdom operation.265  He 
described himself as an atheist growing up in affluent Melbourne, passionate about 
international politics.  He hated the American occupation of Iraq and the Israeli 
occupation of Palestine.  In one of his posts, he describes his anger with the global 
system that pushed him to Qutbism and need for violent revolution: 
The turning point in my ideological development [began with] my complete 
hatred and opposition to the entire system Australia and the majority of the 
world was based upon. It was also the moment I realized that violent global 
revolution was necessary to eliminate this system of governance and that I 
would likely be killed in this struggle.266  
 
In another post, he describes how he debated among different ideologies that 
offered an alternative to the unacceptable system of democracy, "Socialism? 
Communism?? Nazism???... It was Islam that for me stood out as easy to understand 
and was shockingly consistent with established historical and scientific facts.”267  His 
father described Jake as having psychological problems; he was bullied at school and 
suffered from paranoia.268  He converted to Islam after the death of his mother, and 
interacted with members of ISIS online.  By 2014, he was radicalized.  He intended to 
conduct a terrorist attack in Melbourne, but decided the attack would call too much 
attention.  He traveled to Iraq and volunteered to become a suicide bomber.  When in 
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Iraq, Bilardi told a BBC reporter, "I came here chasing death, I might as well kill as 
many kuffar as I can."269 
The tragic story of Bilardi represents how an ideology can give a new identity to 
disaffected individuals that need purpose, particularly an identity based in righteous 
anger that places the adherent above the oppressive world.  Bilardi’s psychological 
problems fit within Adam Lankford’s Myth of Martyrdom thesis.  However, the 
ideology transforms the wounded into a true believer.  There is no reason to think 
Bilardi’s emotional anger at the injustice of the world was anything less than a betrayed 
sacred value.  He did not start off with tawhid or a unified Ummah as core sacred values 
to his identity, but a righteous reaction to injustice in the world itself.  After converting 
to Islam, the new sacred values framed his righteous anger.  In a prior generation, he 
would have likely joined a Marxist or fascist organization seeking to unmake the 
modern world.  ISIS is the current vanguard pooling disaffected Westerners’ meaning.   
Sacred values act in the mind of the individual from two angles: pull sacred 
values and push sacred values.270  Pull values are those ideals that inspire the individual.  
Push values are those that the individual embraces to meet some underlying 
psychological need.  When discussing the individual’s will to commit to martyrdom, 
this is the difference between someone finding the sacred values of martyrdom and its 
rewards inherently appealing and attractive (pull), and someone who turns to 
martyrdom because he is depressed and looking for a way out (push).  Nonetheless, the 
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sacred values at work play a critical role, whether as a tool for inspiration or 
rationalization.   
Underlying psychological factors do not undermine the role of ideology in 
explaining the outcome, just as the ideology does not undermine the role of underlying 
emotional factors.  The destructive narrative is more pernicious for the emotionally 
disturbed seeking to escape life, because the narrative turns the suicidal into murderers 
as well.  The fourth and fifth groups of self-selected martyrs are closer than they are 
separate because they are both centered on a search for meaning.  For the ideologue, the 
ideology offers an identity that makes the group member a part of an esoteric elite 
superior to the rest of the world.  Truth and salvation comes through the ascension of 
the precious tribe.  For the emotionally disturbed, the ideology that saves the world 
heals many wounds and offsets personal shame.  The lack of a safe, strong, and 
attractive local identity drives both.   
The missing local identity creates a void that adventure and revolution provides.  
As of 2014, there were 370 Belgians among ISIS compared to 70 Indonesians.271  
Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, yet the call to for Indonesians to 
join ISIS is comparatively small compared to the Islamic community in Belgium, which 
represents 4-6% of the total Belgian population (11 million, 440,000 to 660,000).  One 
Belgian fighter described his reason to join ISIS with the simple phrase, “it’s boring in 
Belgium.”272  Prosperity and personal economic security gut the urgency of life and 
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mute the sacred values that meet core psychologic needs over community, nation, faith, 
and interdependency.   
Civilization requires banality.  The specialized division of labor that produces a 
wide variety of goods and services needs stability, repetitiveness, and commitment.  
However, underlying needs for meaning, for belonging to a group, for cosmic 
significance, remain despite basic needs being met.  If anything, prosperity pushes the 
underlying psychological needs for identity to the forefront.  The goal for a civilized 
society should be to find sacred values in the mundane, to find meaning in civilization, 
and to build bonds across diverse communities within a nation, so that alienation from 
the larger nation is uncommon.  The United Kingdom has started to push for inculcating 
British identity in the schools, to ensure that a common national identity is rectified that 
spans religion and ethnic background.273  In other words, so that all Britons—whether 
Christian, Muslim, or non-religious—find being British a satisfying in-group. 
In the 14th Century, the Arab historian and founder of sociology Ibn Khaldun 
described asabiyya (“group feeling”) as the social power that drives the rise and fall of 
societies.274  Group feeling is the psychological and emotional bond that the individual 
has for the group in which he is a member.  It is the fundamental glue for civilization.  
If the individual has strong group feeling, the greater chance the individual will fight 
and defend the group and its politics.  If group feeling weakens among the members of 
a society, then a new group with superior group feeling will overthrow the decayed 
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society.  Although societal collapse may be a step too far in this analysis, we can see 
how the weak group feeling both for and among local in-groups drives individuals to 
find in-groups that have strong group feeling.  Since social identity is a necessary 
component to individual identity, the “weak” local in-groups are unacceptable options 
to internalize.  This freedom to choose a new in-group drives individuals to find the best 
in-groups, with the best rewards, yet based in the core sacred values that the local in-
groups fail to uphold.  Thus, local and national leaders need to construct strong group 
feeling for local and national identities, so that the radicalized in-groups do not have an 
identity void to penetrate. 
This leads to the consequences of self-selected national identity, and the role of 
cognitive occupation in suicide terrorism.  Robert Pape’s Dying to Win argues that 
occupation causes suicide terrorism.  The United States’ interactions in the Middle East, 
whether in regards to troops on the ground or heavy handed sponsorship, causes suicide 
terrorism.  Israel’s occupation of Palestine causes suicide terrorism.  Thus, Robert 
Pape’s policy recommendation is that democracies should not occupy the homeland of 
nationalists.  
As stated in chapter 1, Pape’s theory has been criticized from different angles.  
Assaf Moghadam argues that Pape’s definition of occupation is vague, as it essentially 
makes any international conflict an occupation.275  According to Michael Horowitz, 
Pape’s statistical model no longer predicts the nationalist theory of suicide terrorism 
with data updated since 2005.276  Jeffery Lewis argues that the relationship between 
occupation and suicide terrorism is spurious, as underlying societal conflict leads to 
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both the occupation and the usage of suicide terrorism.277  Scott Atran objects to Pape’s 
methodology to explain a complex human phenomenon with a statistical model, since 
any statistical model only proves correlation and not causation.278  Atran’s full critique 
of Pape’s occupation theme is as follows: 
When Egyptian Bedouin are dying to kill European tourists and the Egyptians 
who cater to them; when British citizens blow themselves up along with other 
British because of the country’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan; when 
jihadis exclusively target co-religionists linked to the secular government in 
Bangladesh, which is not a particularly close friend of the United States or its 
allies; when Malaysian bombers kill Australians and Balinese Hindus in 
Indonesia as “self-defense” in a “clash of civilizations” between Islam and the 
United States; and when Arabs from more than a dozen countries rush to 
embrace death in Iraq in order to kill Shi‘as, who are probably more supportive 
of Iran than they are of the United States, it is quite a stretch to identify the 
common thread as a secular struggle over foreign occupation of a homeland, 
unless “secular” covers transcendent ideologies, “foreign occupation” includes 
tourism, and “homeland” expands to at least three continents.279   
 
Qutbist ideology regards a hint of Western influence as evidence of occupation, thus 
lines are blurred between actual occupation and cognitive occupation.280  Since the 
cognitive terrain is relative to the characteristics of the sacred values among 
communities, any in-group can use Pape’s argument as justification for occupation.  To 
the Marxist, the capitalist world system occupies the legitimate means of production.   
 The concept of cognitive occupation is worthy of discussion, and how Pape’s 
thesis explains the desire to recreate the Caliphate.  To Qutbists, the European empires 
carved up the Ottoman Empire into Western-sponsored governments that stand in the 
way of a recreated Caliphate.  The real nation is the Islamic Ummah, which requires a 
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pure Islamic State.  Any structure in the way of a pure Islamic State is a type of 
occupation.  For Qutbists, the Arab-Islamic governments are occupiers.  For Muslims in 
the Arab-Islamic world, the artificial governments carved from Sykes-Picot Agreement 
weaken the cognitive allegiance to being Syrian, Iraqi, or Lebanese.   
 This interpretation works from a constructivist perspective.  The imagined 
Ummah is another type of Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities.  However, 
there are three problems with this approach in relation to the Pape thesis.  First, implicit 
in Pape’s thesis is a moral component, based in two assumptions.  The first assumption 
is that all nationalism is equally just (or unjust), and the second is that a suicide 
bombing campaign is one of the worst consequences of inter or intrastate conflict.  
Foreign agents need to remove themselves from local nationalist-based conflicts, and 
countries would do best to heed the ambitions of nationalist-secessionist movements 
that perceive the government as occupier.   
The problem with treating all nationalist movements as equal is that the 
religious-based nation is essentially universal, whereas the traditional national liberation 
movement is local.  Not all constructed national identities are equal, particularly in 
regard to global consequences.  The aspirations of the Tamils or Kurds to have their 
own nation-state are similar to each other, but they differ from the aspirations of 
Qutbists to unravel the internationally sanctioned order in the Arab World.  The Tamils 
and Kurds are attempting to find a means to participate in the global system; the 
Qutbists are seeking to overthrow the global system.  Thus, it may be better for regional 
and global to suffer a suicide bombing campaign than it is to concede the nationalist 
aspirations of Qutbists.   
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The second problem is the strategic logic of suicide terrorism works if rebels 
perceive the tactic to be successful.  The cycle of the tactic’s adoption would be greatly 
reduced if the strategic objectives of its practitioners were intentionally obstructed.  The 
third problem is competing claims over terrain complicates acknowledgement of 
nationalist ambition.  According to Qutbist thought, Spain is occupying the Caliphate as 
well, and thus Spain must stop occupying itself.  The Israel-Palestine issue is an 
example of this, as each group has sacred values that are intractable.   
Policy Implications for the Individual Logic of Suicide Terrorism 
The recommendations below are intended to address the lessons from this 
argument on policy, specifically the role of identity on decision-making.  Because of the 
scope of this paper, the policy recommendations are broad strategic objectives for 
Western nation-states in terms of both domestic and international policy.  This is not 
intended to demonstrate “how to defeat ISIS,” nor to provide such vague goals that are 
not implementable, but instead show how nation-states should consider the role of 
ideology in suicide terrorism.   
 All tools of statecraft must be on the table to confront suicide terrorism 
organizations.  The Pape thesis argues that occupation causes suicide terrorism, but the 
end-state objectives of groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS are worse than the existence 
of a suicide bombing campaign.  As horrible as a suicide bombing campaign is, the 
collapse of many Middle Eastern governments at the expense of a reestablished 
Caliphate is worse.  The process would lead to more deaths and social upheaval.  This is 
not an argument for occupation, but an argument against removing from the table 
military intervention or support to perceived occupying governments. 
106 
 Western governments must celebrate the greater national in-group and 
demonstrate how their respective national identities overlap with core sacred values 
of minority communities. Western governments must embrace diversity without 
sacrificing a larger identity that connects everyone into one larger “people.”  The United 
States and Canada have some of the highest patriotic rates among Muslims in the 
West.281  The European countries do not.  This is a problem with nationality on the 
European continent, as their national identities center on ethnicity first and cognitive 
identity second.  It is possible for Muslim immigrants in America and Canada to believe 
they are American and Canadian compared to Muslim immigrants in Germany or 
France to believe they are German or French.  Instilling national identity to European 
Muslims is necessary to bond minorities with the national in-group.  Domestic agencies 
must conduct outreach to minority communities and integrate them into the national 
identity in a way that is respectful, inclusive, but nonetheless oriented toward 
integration.  Ibn Khaldun warned that when a society loses “group feeling,” societal 
decay is the result.282  Although the countries of Belgium and France losing some 
Muslims to ISIS may not be complete societal decay, the evidence suggests that these 
foreign fighters have no group feeling to established local or national in-groups.   
The hesitancy of European countries to embrace national identity as a unifying 
force must stop, a remnant of World Wars that are over 75 years old now.  The 
dismantling of national identity has created a void that strident and radical belief 
                                                 
281 Based on 2008 data, more Muslims believed in the American dream than non-Muslims.  See Sageman, 
97.  See also “Muslim Canadians increasingly proud of and attached to Canada, survey suggests.”  CBC 
News.  27 April 2016.  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/grenier-muslim-canadians-environics-1.3551591 (Accessed 3 May 
2016). 
282 Sidani, Yusuf M. 2008. "Ibn Khaldun of North Africa: an AD 1377 Theory of Leadership".Journal of 
Management History. 14, no. 1: 73-86.  79. 
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systems can exploit.  This is not without controversy and peril as the British 
government’s attempts to project British values into British Muslim communities has 
been met some various degrees of resistance—not just from the Muslim community, but 
from British subjects clinging to the sacred value of tolerance over social integration.283  
Nonetheless, nation-states must leverage agencies, non-profit organizations, and even 
firms to build community and group feeling internally. 
 Work with Salafis, not against them.  Strict Salafi schools are the most 
vociferous and effective opponents of violent jihad.284  The Salafi label has been 
villainized, but most Salafis are not militant jihadists and they reject ISIS.  The Da’wa 
call to Islam is the main course of spreading Salafism.  The first priority of the Salafi is 
personal purification and religious observance.  Avoiding fitna (internecine warfare 
among Muslims) is a sacred value in Islam that Qutbists routinely violate, yet Salafis 
believe that propagating fitna is one of the worst crimes a Muslim can commit.285 This 
takes wisdom on the part of nation-states, as American officials publicly embracing 
Salafist preachers would likely tarnish their message and mitigate their effectiveness.  
Nonetheless, there are ways with Influence Operations (IO) that American and Western 
operatives can work behind the scenes to promote and assist the effort of Salafist 
preachers to counter the Qutbist message.   
Publicly appealing to “moderates” in a religion does little to create a 
bandwagon against radical ideologies.  Most devout individuals take their faith 
seriously and resent being called moderate, and most individuals attracted to radicalism 
want nothing to do with moderation.  Work with the faithful and devout to sustain 
                                                 
283 Maher, Shiraz.  “The roots of radicalization?  It’s identity, stupid.”  The Guardian.  17 June 2015. 
284 Wood, Graeme. 
285 Ibid. 
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global security.  As mentioned above, publicly embracing certain religious leaders or 
themes may be counterproductive, but it is equally counterproductive to message a 
stance as “secular” or “moderate,” which polarizes Western strategic objectives among 
the devout, both internally and externally.   
Identify the sacred values underpinning the martyrdom narrative and 
demonstrate that those sacred values have been abused.  For example, the argument 
that the martyrdom operation is not suicide—which is forbidden in Islam—is weak.  
Finding ways both domestically and internationally to spread the religious arguments 
against martyrdom—without contaminating the messenger—would help to weaken the 
conviction in the individual prospective bomber that martyrdom leads to heaven. 
Promote mental health awareness among minority communities.  Push 
messages on the virtue of mental health assistance to families of young men, considered 
prime recruiting ground for ISIS.  Few parents genuinely want their children to 
immigrate to Iraq to fight and die for the Islamic State.  Promote the value—and 
honor—in seeking psychiatric help for the good of the family. 
This paper integrates research from anthropology, social cognition, and 
intergroup hostility to understand how ideology influences the decision to commit 
murder-suicide.  The Qutbist ideology structures who the bad guys are, why they are 
worthy of death, and why death is not the end.  Combatting the sponsoring organization 
is necessary, but confronting the underlying ideological assumption is necessary as 
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Appendix 1: Graphs, Number of Suicide Attacks Total by Era 
The following graphs are intended to visualize trends in targets by selected countries 
and eras.  I note the database START or CPOST for each graph.   
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Appendix 2: Graphs, Number of Suicide Attacks by Country 
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